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THE GREEK WHITE BOOK
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
1913-1917

PREFACED BY THE TREATIES DEALING WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HELLENIC STATE AND THE
INCORPORATION WITH IT OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH AND GREEK
TEXTS BY THEODORE P. ION, D.C.L.

REVISED EDITION

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF CARROLL N. BROWN, PH.D.

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DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

TREATY ARRANGEMENTS DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF GREECE

PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND
RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE ¹

London, February 3, 1830

[The following clauses of this protocol were referred to in the treaty
of 7th May, 1832.²]

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

Present: The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Russia.

Independence of Greece

§ 1. Greece shall form an independent state, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, attached to complete independence.

Form of Government

§ 3. The Greek Government shall be monarchical, and hereditary according to the order of primogeniture. It shall be confided to a prince, who shall not be capable of being chosen from among those of the families reigning in the states that signed the treaty of the 6th July, 1827,³ and who shall bear the title of Sovereign Prince of Greece. The choice of that prince shall form the object of subsequent communications and stipulations.

¹ Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, Vol. II, p. 841; for French version, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. XVII, p. 191.

² Printed *infra*, p. 68.

³ This treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the pacification of Greece as a dependency of Turkey. Hertslet, Vol. I, p. 769.

Guarantee of three Powers

§ 8. Each of the three courts shall retain the power, secured to it by Article VI of the treaty of the 6th July, 1827, of guaranteeing the whole of the foregoing arrangements and articles. The Acts of Guarantee, if there be any, shall be drawn up separately; the operation and effects of these different Acts shall become, in conformity with the above-mentioned article, the object of further stipulations on the part of the high Powers. No troops belonging to one of the contracting Powers shall be allowed to enter the territory of the new Greek state, without the consent of the two other courts who signed the treaty.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND BAVARIA ON THE OTHER, RELATIVE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GREECE.¹

Signed at London, May 7, 1832

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, exercising the power conveyed to them by the Greek nation, to make choice of a sovereign for Greece, raised to the rank of an independent state, and being desirous of giving to that country a fresh proof of their friendly disposition by the election of a prince descended from a royal house, the friendship and alliance of which can not fail to be of essential service to Greece, and which has already acquired claims to her esteem and gratitude, have resolved to offer the crown of the new Greek state to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of his Majesty the King of Bavaria.

His Majesty the King of Bavaria, on his part, acting the character of guardian of the said Prince Otho during his minority, participating in the views of the three courts, and duly appreciating the motives which have induced them to fix their choice upon a prince of his House, has determined to accept the crown of Greece for his second son, the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria.

¹ Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 893; for French version, see State Papers, Vol. XIX, p. 33.

In consequence of such acceptance, and for the purpose of agreeing upon the arrangements which it has rendered necessary, their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Bavaria on the other, have named as their plenipotentiaries, viz.:—

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a member of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, and his Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of the French, the Sieur Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince-Duke de Talleyrand, Peer of France, his said Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Christopher, Prince of Lieven, General of Infantry in his Armies, his Aide-de-Camp General, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty, etc.; and the Sieur Adam, Count Matuszewic, Privy Councillor of His said Majesty, etc.;

And His Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Sieur Augustus, Baron de Cetto, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

Offer of hereditary sovereignty of Greece to Prince Otho of Bavaria

Art. I. The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, duly authorized for this purpose by the Greek nation, offer the hereditary sovereignty of Greece to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

Acceptance of hereditary sovereignty by King of Bavaria

Art. II. His Majesty the King of Bavaria, acting in the name of his said son, a minor, accepts, on his behalf, the hereditary sovereignty of Greece, on the conditions hereinafter settled.

Title of King of Greece

Art. III. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall bear the title of King of Greece.¹

Greece to form a monarchical and independent state, under the guarantee of Great Britain, France, and Russia

Art. IV. Greece, under the sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of the three courts, shall form a monarchical and independent state, according to the terms of the protocol signed between the said courts on the 3d February, 1830, and accepted both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte.

Limits of Greece

Art. V. The limits of the Greek state shall be such as shall be definitively settled by the negotiations which the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia have recently opened with the Ottoman Porte, in execution of the protocol of 26th September, 1831.

King of Greece to be a contracting party to definitive treaty

Art. VI. The three courts having beforehand determined to convert the protocol of the 3d of February, 1830, into a definitive treaty, as soon as the negotiations relative to the limits of Greece shall have terminated,² and to communicate such treaty to all the states with which they have relations, it is hereby agreed that they shall fulfil this engagement, and that His Majesty the King of Greece shall become a contracting party to the treaty in question.

Three courts to obtain recognition of King Otho

Art. VII. The three courts shall, from the present moment, use their influence to procure the recognition of the Prince Otho of Bavaria as King of Greece, by all the sovereigns and states with whom they have relations.

¹ The title of the present king is "King of the Hellenes," the change of title being made by protocols of 3d August, and 13th October, 1863. Hertslet, Vol. II, pp. 1563-4.

² Arrangement of 21st July, 1832. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 903.

Royal crown to be hereditary

Art. VIII.¹ The Royal Crown and dignity shall be hereditary in Greece; and shall pass to the direct and lawful descendants and heirs of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, in the order of primogeniture. In the event of the decease of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, without direct and lawful issue, the crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primogeniture. In the event of the decease of the last-mentioned prince also, without direct and lawful issue, the crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primogeniture.²

Crowns of Greece and Bavaria not to be united

In no case shall the crown of Greece and the crown of Bavaria be united upon the same head.

Majority of Prince Otho

Art. IX. The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his 20th year, that is to say, on the first of June, 1835.

Regency during minority of King of Greece

Art. X. During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent, by a regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

Prince Otho to retain his appanages in Bavaria, and to be assisted by King of Bavaria

Art. XI. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall retain the full possession of his appanages in Bavaria. His Majesty the King of Bavaria,

¹ King Otho renounced his right of succession to the throne of Bavaria on the 18th March, 1836.

² See explanatory and supplemental article, 30th April, 1833. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 919.

moreover, engages to assist, as far as may be in his power, the Prince Otho in his position in Greece, until a revenue shall have been set apart for the crown in that state.

*Guarantee of loan by three Powers*¹

Art. XII. In execution of the stipulations of the protocol of the 20th of February, 1830, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias engages to guarantee, and their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of the French, engage to recommend, the former to his Parliament, and the latter to his Chambers, to enable their Majesties to guarantee, on the following conditions, a loan to be contracted by the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece.

Extent of loan

1. The principal of the loan to be contracted under the guarantee of the three Powers shall not exceed a total amount of 60,000,000 of francs.

Loan to be raised by instalments

2. The said loan shall be raised by instalments of 20,000,000 of francs each.

Guarantee of interest and sinking fund by three Powers

3. For the present, the first instalment only shall be raised, and the three courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of the said instalment.

4. The second and third instalments of the said loan may also be raised, according to the necessities of the Greek state, after previous agreement between the three courts and His Majesty the King of Greece.

5. In the event of the second and third instalments of the above-mentioned loan being raised in consequence of such an agreement, the three courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of these two instalments, as well as of the first.

¹ See treaty of 29th March, 1864, *infra*, p. 79.

Payment of interest and sinking fund by Greece

6. The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three courts, the first revenues of the state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three courts shall have been completely secured for the current year.

*Representatives of three courts to watch over fulfilment of
engagement by Greece*

The diplomatic representatives of the three courts in Greece shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last-mentioned stipulation.

Pecuniary compensation to Turkey to be paid out of proceeds of loan

Art. XIII. In case a pecuniary compensation in favor of the Ottoman Porte should result from the negotiations which the three courts have already opened at Constantinople for the definitive settlement of the limits of Greece, it is understood that the amount of such compensation shall be defrayed out of the proceeds of the loan which forms the subject of the preceding article.

*Bavarian troops to be raised for King of Greece. Evacuation of
Greece by Allied troops*

Art. XIV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall lend his assistance to the Prince Otho in raising in Bavaria a body of troops, not exceeding 3,500 men, to be employed in his service, as King of Greece, which corps shall be armed, equipped, and paid by the Greek state, to be sent thither as soon as possible, in order to relieve the troops of the Alliance hitherto stationed in Greece. The latter shall remain in that country entirely at the disposal of the Government of His Majesty the King of Greece, until the arrival of the body of troops above mentioned. Immediately upon their arrival the troops of the Alliance already referred to shall retire, and altogether evacuate the Greek territory.

Bavarian officers to organize a national military force

Art. XV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall also assist the Prince Otho in obtaining the services of a certain number of Bavarian officers, who shall organize a national military force in Greece.

Regency to proceed to Greece without delay

Art. XVI. As soon as possible after the signature of the present convention, the three councillors who are to be associated with His Royal Highness the Prince Otho by His Majesty the King of Bavaria, in order to compose the Regency of Greece, shall repair to Greece, shall enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said Regency, and shall prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the sovereign, who, on his part, will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible.

Declaration of three courts to Greek nation

Art. XVII. The three courts shall announce to the Greek nation, by a joint declaration, the choice which they have made of His Royal Highness Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, and shall afford the Regency all the support in their power.

Ratifications

Art. XVIII. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 7th May, in the year of our Lord, 1832.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON.

(L. S.) TALLEYRAND.

(L. S.) LIEVEN.

(L. S.) MATUSZEWIC.

(L. S.) A. DE CETTO.

[An Act was passed by the German Diet, 4th October, 1832, recognizing Prince Otho as King of Greece.]

[An Act of Parliament was passed on the 16th August, 1832 (2 and 3 Will. IV, cap. 121), to enable His Majesty to carry out the above convention.]

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND DENMARK, ON THE OTHER PART, RELATIVE TO THE ACCESSION OF PRINCE WILLIAM OF DENMARK TO THE THRONE OF GREECE.¹

Signed at London, 13th July, 1863; ratifications exchanged at London, 3d August, 1863

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

Reference to guarantee of Great Britain, France, and Russia

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity

Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, being anxious to smooth the difficulties which have occurred in the Kingdom of Greece, placed under their common guarantee, have judged it necessary to come to an understanding with regard to the arrangements to be taken in order to give effect to the wish of the Greek nation, which calls the Prince William of Denmark to the Hellenic throne.

His Majesty the King of Denmark, on his part, responding to the invitation of their said Majesties, has consented to afford them his coöperation with a view to that result, conformable to the interests of the general peace.

In consequence, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Denmark on the other, have resolved to conclude a treaty, and have for that purpose named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable John Earl Russell, her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, etc.,

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur John Baptist Louis Baron Gros, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron de Brunnow, his actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

¹ Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 1545; for French version, see State Papers, Vol. LIII, p. 28.

And His Majesty the King of Denmark, the Sieur Torben de Bille, his Chamberlain, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

*Acceptance of hereditary sovereignty of Greece by King of Denmark
for Prince William of Denmark*

Art. I. His Majesty the King of Denmark, in accordance with the Prince Christian of Denmark, acting in the character of guardian of his second son the Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus George, accepts for that prince, a minor, the hereditary sovereignty of Greece, which is offered to him by the Senate and the National Assembly of Greece in the name of the Hellenic nation.

Title of King of the Greeks

Art. II. The Prince William of Denmark shall bear the title of George I, King of the Greeks (*Roi des Grecs*).¹

Greece to form a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state

Art. III. Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark, and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state.

Limits of Greek Territory. Annexation of Ionian Islands to Greece

Art. IV. The limits of the Greek Territory, determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between the three courts and the Ottoman Porte, on the 21st July, 1832,² shall receive an extension by the union of the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic Kingdom, when such union, proposed by the Government of her Britannic Majesty, shall have been found to be in accordance with the wishes of the Ionian Parliament, and shall have obtained the assent of the courts of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.³

¹ See note ¹, p. 70, *supra*.

² Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 903.

³ Decree 18/30th March, 1863, annexed to Protocol of 5th June, 1863. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1539.

Union of Ionian Islands to be under guarantee of protecting Powers

Art. V. The Ionian Islands, when their union with the Kingdom of Greece shall have been effected, shall be comprised in the guarantee stipulated by Article III of the present treaty.

Crowns of Greece and Denmark never to be united

Art. VI. In no case shall the crown of Greece and the crown of Denmark be united on the same head.

Religion of King of Greece

Art. VII. In conformity with the principle of the Hellenic Constitution recognized by the treaty signed at London, on the 20th November, 1852,¹ and proclaimed by the decree of the National Assembly of Greece, of the 30th March, 1863 the legitimate successors of King George I must profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of the East.

Majority of King of Greece

Art. VIII. The majority of Prince William of Denmark, fixed by the law of the royal family at 18 years complete, that is to say, on the 24th December, 1863, shall be considered as attained before that date, if a decree of the National Assembly should recognize the necessity thereof.

Appropriation by Ionian Islands to civil list of King of the Greeks

Art. IX. At the moment when the union of the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic Kingdom shall take place, according to the terms of Article IV of the present treaty, Her Britannic Majesty will recommend to the Government of the United States of the Ionian Islands to appropriate annually a sum of £10,000 sterling to augment the civil list of His Majesty George I, King of the Greeks (*Roi des Grecs*).

Personal dotation to King of the Greeks by protecting Powers

Art. X. Each of the three courts will give up in favor of Prince William of Denmark £4,000 a year out of the sums which the Greek

¹ Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1156.

Treasury has engaged to pay annually to each of them, in pursuance of the arrangement concluded at Athens by the Greek Government, with the concurrence of the Chambers, in the month of June, 1860.¹

It is expressly understood that these three sums, forming a total of £12,000 sterling annually, shall be destined to constitute a personal dotation of His Majesty the King, in addition to the civil list fixed by the law of the state.

Financial engagements of Greece to be maintained. Greek loan

Art. XI. The accession of Prince William to the Hellenic throne shall not involve any change in the financial engagements which Greece has contracted by Article XII of the convention signed at London, on the 7th May, 1832, towards the Powers guarantees of the loan.

It is equally understood that the Powers will, in concert, watch over the execution of the engagement taken by the Hellenic Government in the month of June, 1860, upon the representation of the three courts.

Recognition of Prince William of Denmark by foreign Powers

Art. XII. The three courts shall, from this moment, use their influence in order to procure the recognition of Prince William of Denmark in the character of King of the Greeks (*Roi des Grecs*), by all the sovereigns and states with whom they have relations.

Arrival of King George I in Greece

Art. XIII. His Majesty the King of Denmark reserves to himself to take the measures which may be most proper for facilitating the arrival of King George I in his dominions as soon as possible.

Support to Greek Government

Art. XIV. The three courts will bring the present treaty to the knowledge of the Greek Government, and will afford to that government all the support in their power, while awaiting the speedy arrival of His Majesty the King.

¹ Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1445.

Ratifications

Art. XV. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 13th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, 1863.

(L. S.) RUSSELL.

(L. S.) BILLE.

(L. S.) BON. GROS.

(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND GREECE,
RESPECTING THE UNION OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS TO THE KINGDOM
OF GREECE.¹

*Signed at London, 29th March, 1864; ratifications exchanged at London,
25th April, 1864*²

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

Reference to Treaty of 5th November, 1815

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland made known to the Legislative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands that, with a view to the eventual union of those Islands to the Kingdom of Greece, she was prepared, if the Ionian Parliament should express a wish to that effect, to abandon the protectorate of those Islands, confided to Her Majesty by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 5th November, 1815,³ between the courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Such wish having been expressed by a vote of the said Legislative Assembly passed unanimously on the 7/19th October, 1863,⁴ Her Britannic Majesty consented by Article I of the treaty concluded on the 14th November, 1863,⁵

¹ Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. III, p. 1589.

² The Sultan acceded to this treaty on the 8th April, 1865.

³ Hertslet, Vol. I, p. 337. ⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1565. ⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1569.

between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to renounce the said protectorate under certain conditions specified in that treaty, and since defined by subsequent protocols.

On their part, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, consented by the same article, and under the same conditions, to accept such renunciation, and to recognize, in conjunction with Her Britannic Majesty, the union of those Islands to the Kingdom of Greece.

In virtue of Article V of the treaty signed at London on the 13th July, 1863, it was moreover agreed by common consent between Her Britannic Majesty and their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of All the Russias, that the Ionian Islands, when their union to the Kingdom of Greece should have been effected, as contemplated by Article IV of the same treaty, should be comprised in the guarantee stipulated in favor of Greece by the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in virtue of the convention signed at London on the 7th May, 1832.

In consequence, and in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of the 13th July, 1863, and with the terms of Article VI of the treaty of the 14th November, 1863, whereby the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in their character of guaranteeing Powers of the Kingdom of Greece, reserved to themselves to conclude a treaty with the Hellenic Government as to the arrangements which might become necessary in consequence of the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece, their said Majesties have resolved to proceed to negotiate with His Majesty the King of the Hellenes a treaty for the purpose of carrying into execution the stipulations above mentioned.

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes having given his assent to the conclusion of such treaty, their said Majesties have named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable John Earl Russell, Viscount Amberley of Amberley and Ardsalle, a Peer of the United Kingdom, a member of Her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur Godefroy Bernard Henry Alphonse, Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne Lauraguais, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron de Brunnow, his Actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

And His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, the Sieur Charilaüs S. Tricoupi, a representative in the National Assembly of the Hellenes;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

Renunciation of Great Britain to protectorate over the Ionian Islands

Art. I. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, desiring to realize the wish expressed by the Legislative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands, that those Islands should be united to Greece, has consented, on the conditions hereinafter specified, to renounce the protectorate over the Islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Santa Maura, Ithaca, Cerigo, and Paxo, with their dependencies, which, in virtue of the treaty signed at Paris, on the 5th November, 1815, by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were constituted a single free and independent state, under the denomination of "the United States of the Ionian Islands," placed under the immediate and exclusive protection of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors.

Union of Ionian Islands to Greece

In consequence, Her Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in their character of signing parties to the convention of the 7th May, 1832, recognize such union, and declare that Greece, within the limits determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the Ottoman Porte, on the 21st July, 1832, including the Ionian Islands, shall form a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state, under the sovereignty of His Majesty King George, and under the guarantee of the three courts.

*Perpetual neutrality of Ionian Islands*¹

Art. II. The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in their character of guaranteeing Powers of Greece, declare, with the assent of the courts of Austria and Prussia, that the Islands of Corfu and Paxo, as well as their dependencies, shall, after their union to the Hellenic Kingdom, enjoy the advantages of perpetual neutrality.

Greece to maintain the neutrality

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, on his part, to maintain such neutrality.

Treaties, etc., of commerce and navigation between Great Britain and foreign Powers relative to Ionian Islands to remain in force until conclusion of new treaty

Art. III. The union of the Ionian Islands to the Hellenic Kingdom shall not involve any change as to the advantages conceded to foreign commerce and navigation in virtue of treaties and conventions concluded by foreign Powers with Her Britannic Majesty, in her character of protector of the Ionian Islands.

All the engagements which result from the said transactions, as well as from the regulations actually in force in relation thereto, shall be maintained and strictly observed, as hitherto.

In consequence, it is expressly understood that foreign vessels and commerce in Ionian ports, as well as the navigation between Ionian ports and the ports of Greece, shall continue to be subject to the same treatment, and placed under the same conditions as before the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece, until the conclusion of new formal conventions, or of arrangements destined to regulate between the parties concerned, questions of commerce and navigation, as well as questions relating to the regular service of communication by post.

Terms within which new commercial treaties are to be concluded

Such new conventions shall be concluded in fifteen years, or sooner, if possible.²

¹ A protocol on this subject was also signed between the five Powers on the 25th January, 1864.

² The Austrian and Prussian Governments assented to this arrangement.

Freedom of worship and religious toleration

Art. IV. The union of the United States of the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece shall in no wise invalidate the principles established by the existing legislation of those Islands with regard to freedom of worship and religious toleration; accordingly the rights and immunities established in matters of religion by Chapters I and V of the Constitutional Charter of the United States of the Ionian Islands,¹ and specifically the recognition of the Orthodox Greek Church as the dominant religion in those Islands; the entire liberty of worship granted to the established Church of the protecting Power; and the perfect toleration promised to other Christian communions shall, after the union, be maintained in their full force and effect.

The special protection guaranteed to the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the advantages of which that church is actually in possession, shall be equally maintained; and the subjects belonging to that communion shall enjoy in the Ionian Islands the same freedom of worship which is recognized in their favor by the protocol of the 3d February, 1830.

The principle of entire civil and political equality between subjects belonging to different creeds, established in Greece by the same protocol, shall be likewise in force in the Ionian Islands.

Provision of Ionian Islands towards the civil list of the King of the Hellenes

Art. V. The Legislative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands has decreed by a resolution passed on the 7/19th October, 1863, that the sum of £10,000 sterling a year shall be appropriated, in monthly payments, to the augmentation of the civil list of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, so as to constitute the first charge upon the revenue of the Ionian Islands, unless provision be made for such payment, according to the constitutional forms, out of the revenues of the Kingdom of Greece.

In consequence, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes engages to carry that decree duly into execution.

¹ Ratified by the Sovereign of Great Britain on the 26th August, 1817.

Relinquishment by protecting Powers of portion of the annual sums to be paid to them by Greece

Art. VI. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, agree to relinquish in favor of His Majesty King George I, each £4,000 sterling a year, out of the sums which the Greek Treasury has engaged to pay annually to each of them, in virtue of the arrangement concluded at Athens by the Greek Government, with the concurrence of the Greek Chambers, in the month of June, 1860 (No. 318).

Amounts relinquished to form personal dotation of King of Greece

It is expressly understood that these three sums, forming a total of £12,000 sterling annually, shall be destined to constitute a personal dotation of His Majesty King George I, in addition to the civil list fixed by the law of the state. The accession of His Majesty to the Hellenic throne shall not otherwise involve any change in the financial engagements which Greece has contracted by Article XII of the convention of 7th May, 1832, towards the Powers guarantees of the loan, nor in the execution of the engagement taken by the Hellenic Government in the month of June, 1860, upon the representation of the three courts.¹

Contracts between Ionian Islands and foreign Powers to be maintained by King of the Hellenes

Art. VII. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes engages to take upon himself all the engagements and contracts lawfully concluded by the Government of the United States of the Ionian Islands, or in their name, by the protecting Power of those Islands, conformably to the Constitution of the Ionian Islands, whether with foreign governments, with companies and associations, or with private individuals; and promises to fulfil the said engagements and contracts fully and completely, as if they had been concluded by His Majesty or by the Hellenic Government. Under this head are specially included: the public debt of the Ionian Islands; the privileges conceded to the Ionian Bank, to the navigation company known under the name of the

¹ An Act of Parliament was passed on the 14th July, 1864 (27th and 28 Vict., cap. 40), to give effect to this arrangement.

Austrian Lloyds, in conformity with the postal convention of the 1st December, 1853, and to the Malta and Mediterranean Gas Company.

Pensions, etc., to British and Ionian subjects to be paid by Greece

Art. VIII. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes promises to take upon himself, —

1. The pensions granted to British subjects by the Ionian Government, in conformity with the rules established in the Ionian Islands respecting pensions.

2. The compensation allowances due to certain individuals actually in the service of the Ionian Government, who will lose their employments in consequence of the union of the Islands to Greece.

3. The pensions which several Ionian subjects are in the enjoyment of, in remuneration of services rendered to the Ionian Government.

Special convention to regulate amounts

A special convention to be concluded between Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes shall determine the amounts of these different heads, and shall regulate the mode of their payment.¹

Withdrawal of British forces from the Ionian Islands

Art. IX. The civil authorities and the military forces of her Britannic Majesty shall be withdrawn from the territory of the United States of the Ionian Islands in three months or sooner, if possible, after the ratification of the present treaty.²

Ratifications

Art. X. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 29th of March, in the year of Our Lord, 1864.

(L. S.) RUSSELL.

(L. S.) CH. TRICOUPI.

(L. S.) LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE.

(L. S.) BRUNNOW.

¹ Convention of same date. Hertslet, Vol. III, p. 1596.

² See protocol of 28th May, 1864. Hertslet, Vol. III, p. 1606.

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1913-1917, ISSUED BY THE
GREEK GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE GRECO-
SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND THE GERMANO-
BULGARIAN INVASION INTO MACEDONIA.¹

PART FIRST

THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE

I. TEXTS

No. 1

PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF ALLIANCE
BETWEEN GREECE AND SERBIA

Signed, April 22/May 5, 1913.

His Excellency Mr. Lambros A. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, and His Excellency Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, Minister of Serbia in Athens, acting on behalf of their governments and in accordance with their instructions, held a conference today and agreed as follows:

1

The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to conclude and sign a treaty of amity and of defensive alliance within the period of twenty days from the signature of the present instrument.

¹ These documents, together with the preceding Table of Contents, cited as the Greek White Book, have been translated from the French and Greek, by Mr. Theodore P. Ion, of the Bar of New York and of the District of Columbia.

Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 45, 46, 60, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, have been translated from the Greek; all others are from French originals.

The words in brackets take the place of illegible words of the texts of the telegrams. Wherever it has been impossible to complete the meaning the statement [words illegible] has been inserted.

The dates indicated in the body of the documents are those of the Julian calendar. — TRANSLATOR.

2

It will be covenanted in that treaty that the two governments will give mutual aid to each other in order that Greece and Serbia may have contiguous boundaries to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river and that the fixing of the new boundaries shall be done in principle on the basis of effective occupation.

The general direction of this boundary shall be as follows:

Starting from the mountain range of Kamena Planina (Kamna) which delimits the upper Schkoumbi to the southwest side of the Ochrida lake, the boundary line will pass round this lake to the south; it will reach the western shore of the Prespa lake at the village Kousko, and passing through the lake it will reach Dolni Dupliani on the eastern shore; from there it will pass eastward near Rahmanli, will follow the line of the water-shed between the Erigon (Tserna) river and the Moglenica and will reach the Axios (Vardar) river at about three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli.

The Greco-Bulgarian as well as the Serbo-Bulgarian boundary lines shall be fixed on the basis of the principle of effective possession and the equilibrium between the three states.

The Serbian boundary line to the north of Ghevgheli will follow the Axios (Vardar) river as far as the confluence of the Bregalnitz river, which it will ascend to a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian boundary.

The Greco-Bulgarian boundary line will run to the south of Kilkitich, to the north of Nigrita, through Orliako, and from there, by the Achinos (Tachinos) lake and the Angitis (Anghista) river, will descend to the sea a little to the east of the harbor of Eleutherai.

All these boundary lines will be fixed in a more detailed manner and will be inserted in the text of the aforesaid treaty of alliance.

3

The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to act in unison, to afford to each other constant assistance in the negotiations which will be opened in regard to the division of the territories ceded by Turkey, and to mutually support the boundary lines indicated above, between Greece and Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, Serbia and Bulgaria.

4

Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the boundaries above indicated and a friendly settlement become impossible, the Governments of Greece and Serbia reserve to themselves the right to propose jointly to Bulgaria that the dispute be submitted to mediation or arbitration. In case Bulgaria should refuse to accept this mode of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude or attempt to impose her claims by force, the two governments, in order to secure the integrity of their possessions, bind themselves to afford to each other military assistance and not to conclude peace except jointly and together.

5

A military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay for the purpose of preparing and insuring the necessary defensive measures in case one of the two states, without provocation on its part, should be attacked by a third Power.

6

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7

The Greek Government binds itself to afford all the facilities and to guarantee for fifty years the entire freedom of the Serbian export and import trade through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from Salonika to Uskup and Monastir.

8

The present instrument shall be kept strictly secret.

Done in duplicate, Athens, this twenty-second day of April in the year one thousand, nine hundred and thirteen.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Greece.*

L. A. COROMILAS.

*The Minister of
Serbia.*

M. BOSCHKOVITCH.

No. 2

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE
KINGDOM OF SERBIA

*Signed, May 19/June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens,
June 8/21, 1913.*

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, considering that it is their duty to look after the security of their people and the tranquillity of their kingdoms; considering furthermore, in their firm desire to preserve a durable peace in the Balkan Peninsula, that the most effective means to attain it is to unite themselves in a close defensive alliance;

Have resolved to conclude an alliance of peace, of friendship, and of mutual protection, promising to each other never to give to their purely defensive agreement an offensive character, and for that purpose they have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; Mr. John Alexandropoulos, his Minister at Belgrade, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Takovo; His Majesty the King of Serbia; Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, his Minister at Athens, Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Saint Sava, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, who, after having exchanged their full powers found in good and due form, have today agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The two high contracting parties covenant expressly the mutual guarantee of their possessions and bind themselves, in case, contrary to their hopes, one of the two kingdoms should be attacked without any provocation on its part, to afford to each other assistance with all their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together.

ARTICLE 2

At the division of the territories of European Turkey, which will be ceded to the Balkan States after the termination of the present war by the treaty of peace with the Ottoman Empire, the two high contracting parties bind themselves not to come to any separate under-

standing with Bulgaria, to afford each other constant assistance, and to proceed always together, upholding mutually their territorial claims and the boundary lines hereafter to be indicated.

ARTICLE 3

The two high contracting parties, considering that it is to the vital interest of their kingdoms that no other state should interpose between their respective possessions to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river, declare that they will mutually assist one another in order that Greece and Serbia may have a common boundary line. This boundary line, based on the principle of effective occupation, shall start from the highest summit of the mountain range of Kamna, delimiting the basin of the Upper Schkoumbi, it shall pass round the the lake Achris (Ochrida), shall reach the western shore of the Prespa lake at the village Kousko and the eastern shore at Lower Dupliani (Dolni Dupliani), shall run near Rahmanli, shall follow the water-shed between the Erigon (Tserna) river and the Moglenica and shall reach the Axios (Vardar) river at a distance of nearly three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli, according to the line drawn in detail in Annex I of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The two high contracting parties agree that the Greco-Bulgarian and Serbo-Bulgarian boundary lines shall be established on the principle of actual possession and the equilibrium between the three states, as follows:

The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow the course of the Axios (Vardar) river up to the confluence of Bojimia-Dere, shall ascend that river, and, passing by the altitudes 120, 350, 754, 895, 571, and the rivers Kriva, Lakavitza, Bregalnica and Zletovska shall proceed towards a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian frontier on the Osogovska Planina, altitude 2225, according to the line drawn in detail in Annex II of the present treaty.

The Greek frontier on the side of Bulgaria shall leave to Greece on the left shore of the Axios (Vardar) the territories occupied by the Greek and Serbian troops opposite Ghevgheli and Davidovo as far as the mountain Beles and the Doiran lake; then, passing to the south of Kilkitch it shall cross the Strymon river north of the Orliako

bridge and shall proceed through the Achinos (Tachinos) lake and the Angitis (Anghista) river to the sea, a little to the east of the Gulf of Eleutherai according to the line drawn in detail in Annex III of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 5

Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the frontiers as indicated above, and every friendly settlement become impossible, the two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to propose, by common agreement, to Bulgaria, that the dispute be submitted to the mediation or arbitration of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers or the chiefs of other states. In case Bulgaria shall refuse to accept this mode of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude against either of the two kingdoms, or attempt to impose her claims by force, the two high contracting parties bind themselves solemnly to afford assistance to each other with all their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together.

ARTICLE 6

In order to prepare and to secure the means of military defense, a military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay upon the signature of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 7

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes covenants that his government shall grant all the necessary facilities and guarantee for a period of fifty years the complete freedom of the export and import trade of Serbia through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from Salonika to Uskup and Monastir. This freedom shall be as broad as possible, provided only it is compatible with the full and entire exercise of the Hellenic sovereignty.

A special convention shall be concluded between the two high contracting parties within one year from this day in order to regulate in detail the carrying out of this article.

ARTICLE 8

The two high contracting parties agree that upon the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, the General Staffs of

the two armies shall come to an understanding with the view of regulating in a parallel manner the increase of the military forces of each state.

ARTICLE 9

The two high contracting parties agree furthermore that, upon the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, they will proceed by common agreement to the study of a plan for a customs convention, in order to draw closer the commercial and economic relations of the two countries.

ARTICLE 10

The present treaty shall be put in force after its signature. It can not be denounced before the expiration of ten years. The intention for the cessation of its force shall be notified by one of the two high contracting parties to the other six months in advance, in the absence of which the agreement shall continue to be binding upon the two states until the expiration of one year from the date of the denunciation.

ARTICLE 11

The present treaty shall be kept strictly secret. It can not be communicated to another Power either totally or partially, except with the consent of the two high contracting parties.

It shall be ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Athens.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and affixed their seals.

Executed in Salonika, in duplicate, the nineteenth day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.

JOHN ALEXANDROPOULOS.

M. BOSCHKOVITCH.

No. 3

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE
KINGDOM OF SERBIA*Signed, May 1/14, 1913.¹*

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, desiring to complete the treaty of alliance concluded between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, by a military convention, have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, Captain John Metaxas, of the Corps of Engineers and of the General Staff of the Army; His Majesty the King of Serbia, Colonel Petar Pechitch of the General Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, of the Infantry, who, after having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In case of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Serbia and Bulgaria, or in case of a sudden attack by the Bulgarian army against the Greek or the Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other mutual military assistance, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces.

ARTICLE 2

In the beginning of the hostilities, at whatever moment they begin, Greece is bound to have an army of ninety thousand fighting men concentrated in the region between the Pangaion Mountain, Salonika and Goumenitsa, and Serbia an army of one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men concentrated in the region of Ghevgheli, Veles (Kioprulu), Koumanovo, Pirot. Besides, Greece is at the same time bound to have her fleet in the Ægean Sea ready for action.

¹ The present military convention was signed ad referendum, but was not ratified. It was replaced by the military convention of May 19/June 1, 1913, printed *infra*.

ARTICLE 3

The two states are bound to transport to the zone of operations the remainder of their military forces, as soon as these shall become available.

ARTICLE 4

A decrease of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by demobilization or the transportation of troops elsewhere, is not permitted, unless there is a written agreement to that effect between the General Staffs of the armies of the two allied states.

ARTICLE 5

The military operations against Bulgaria shall be based upon a common plan of operations. This plan of operations shall be drawn up by the respective General Staffs of the two states, or by their delegates. It may subsequently be modified in consequence of a change of the military situation by a common agreement in writing of the two General Staffs.

ARTICLE 6

After the opening of hostilities, whatever the course of the military operations may be and whatever the localities through which, during the military operations, the troops of the one or the other allied states may pass, and whatever the cities, villages or positions which may be occupied by these troops for military necessities, the occupation of the country lying beyond the boundary line between Greece and Serbia on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, as provided for by the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance, of which the present convention is a complement, is regulated as follows:

The Greek army has the right to occupy the country situated to the south and southeast of the line of Gradec, — the crest line of the Beles mountain, — summit 1800 to the northwest of Karakioi, — altitude 2194 Perelik; the Serbian army, the country lying to the north and northwest of the said line.

If during the military operations one of the two armies shall occupy part of the country, cities, or villages situated in the zone which should be occupied by the other army, it shall evacuate them as soon as the army which, according to the previous paragraph, has the right to their occupation, demands it.

ARTICLE 7

The ultimate object of the military operations of the allied Greek and Serbian armies being the destruction of the military forces of Bulgaria, if one of the two armies can not attain that object in its own theatre of operations, it is bound to accept the assistance of the other army in the same theatre of operations. Still, the army which has attained this object in its own theatre of operations is bound to go to the assistance of the other, independently of whether this assistance was asked for or not, in order that by a joint action of the two allied armies, Bulgaria may be forced to submit to the conditions which shall be laid down by the two allied states and conclude peace.

ARTICLE 8

Neither of the two allied armies can conclude an armistice of a duration of more than twenty-four hours nor can it tacitly suspend hostilities.

An armistice of a duration of more than twenty-four hours can not be concluded except upon a joint agreement in writing of the two allied states; this agreement shall at the same time determine the conditions of the armistice.

ARTICLE 9

The present convention shall be valid as long as the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains in force.

Article 2 of the present convention may be modified by a joint agreement in writing of the General Staffs of the two respective states, after the passing of the present crisis and the ordering of demobilization.

ARTICLE 10

The present convention shall come into force from the day of its ratification by their Majesties the King of the Hellenes and the King of Serbia, or by the respective governments of the allied states.

In faith whereof, the plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention.

Done in duplicate, in Salonika, the first day of May in the year 1913.

For Greece:

Captain J. P. METAXAS.

For Serbia:

Colonel PETAR PECHITCH.

Colonel DOUCHAN TOUFEGDJITCH.

No. 4

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND
THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

*Signed, May 19/June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens,
June 8/21, 1913.*

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, desiring to complete the treaty of alliance concluded between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, by a military convention, have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, Captain Xenophon Stratigos, of the Corps of Engineers, and of the General Staff of the Army; His Majesty the King of Serbia, Colonel Petar Pechitch, of the General Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, of the Infantry, who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In case of war between one of the allied states and a third Power, arising in the circumstances provided for by the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack by important masses — at least two divisions — of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other mutual military support, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces.

ARTICLE 2

In the beginning of the hostilities, at whatever moment they begin, Greece is bound to have an army of ninety thousand fighting men concentrated in the region between the Pangaion Mountain, Salonika, and Goumenitsa, and Serbia an army of one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men concentrated in the region of Ghevgheli, Veles (Kioprulu), Koumanovo, Piro. Besides, Greece is bound to have at the same time her fleet in the Ægean Sea ready for action.

ARTICLE 3

The two states are bound to bring to the zone of operations their remaining military forces, as soon as these shall become available.

ARTICLE 4

A decrease of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by demobilization or by the transportation of troops elsewhere, is not permitted, except on a written agreement between the General Staffs of the armies of the two allied states.

But if Greece, in the case provided for in Article 1, should, at the same time, be found under the necessity of defending herself against an attack of a Power other than Bulgaria, she shall be bound to go to the assistance of Serbia, attacked by Bulgaria, by a number of troops fixed by a joint agreement at the proper time between the two General Staffs, according to the military situation and having due regard to the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Greece.

Conversely, if Serbia should be in need of defending herself against an attack by a Power other than Bulgaria, she shall be bound to go to the assistance of Greece, attacked by Bulgaria, by a number of troops fixed by common agreement at the proper time between the two General Staffs, according to the military situation, and having due regard to the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia.

ARTICLE 5

In case one of the contracting parties shall declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without a previous agreement and the consent of the other contracting party, the latter shall be released from the obligations imposed by Articles 1 and 2 of the present convention. It shall nevertheless maintain a benevolent neutrality towards its ally during the continuation of the war and shall be bound to mobilize immediately in its territory, Greece, at least forty thousand fighting men and Serbia at least fifty thousand fighting men, in such a manner as to protect its neutrality and consequently the liberty of movement of the allied army.

ARTICLE 6

The military operations against Bulgaria shall be based on a common plan of operations. This plan of operations shall be drawn up by the respective General Staffs of the two states or by their delegates. It may be subsequently modified in consequence of a change of the military situation, by a joint agreement in writing of the two General Staffs.

ARTICLE 7

After the opening of the hostilities, whatever the course of the military operations may be and whatever the localities through which, during the military operations, the troops of the one or the other of the allied states may pass, and whatever may be the cities, villages or positions occupied by these troops for military necessities, the final occupation of the country lying beyond the boundary line between Greece and Serbia on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, provided for by the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece, of which the present convention forms a complement, is regulated as follows:

Greece has the right to occupy definitely and to annex the country lying to the south and east of the line which, starting from a point on the Vardar immediately to the north of Schovo, passes between the villages of Bogoroditsa and Mazucovo, afterwards by the crest line between the villages of Selimli and Dautli, it proceeds towards the altitudes 535, 227, runs through the lake proceeding towards the altitude 208, and afterwards towards the altitudes 397, 1494, the crest line of the Beles mountain, summit 1800 M to the northwest of Karakioi up to altitude 2194 (Perelik).

Serbia has the right to occupy definitely and to annex the country lying to the north and the northwest of the said line.

Greece concedes that Serbia shall occupy a zone of territory of a width of ten kilometers, lying on the left shore of the Nestos-Mesta (Karassou), to the north of Xanthi and to the east of Buru-Gölä. Serbia, on the other hand, is bound to allow Greece free passage through this zone and declares that she recognizes the influence of Greece in all the territory lying to the east of this zone and recognizes that she has no claim whatever upon it.

If, during the military operations, one of the two armies occupies part of the country, cities or villages, situated in the zone which should be occupied by the other army, it is bound to evacuate them as soon as the army which, according to the previous paragraph, has the right to their occupation, demands it.

ARTICLE 8

The ultimate object of the military operations of the allied Greek and Serbian armies being the destruction of the military forces of Bulgaria, if one of the two armies can not attain that object in its own

theatre of operations, it is bound to accept the assistance of the other in the same theatre of operations. Still, the army which has attained this object in its own theatre of operations is bound to go to the assistance of the other, independently of whether this assistance was asked for or not, in order that by a joint action of the two allied armies, Bulgaria may be forced to submit to the conditions which shall be laid down by the two allied states and conclude peace.

ARTICLE 9

Neither of the two allied armies can conclude an armistice of more than twenty-four hours duration or tacitly suspend hostilities.

An armistice of more than twenty-four hours duration can not be concluded except upon a joint agreement in writing of the two allied states. This agreement shall at the same time determine the conditions of the armistice.

ARTICLE 10

The allied armies shall mutually enjoy, each on the territory of the other high contracting party, all the rights and privileges granted to the (national) armies of the country by virtue of the laws and ordinances in force, — except as to requisitions, — in regard to general maintenance, revictualling, sanitary service, transportation of the wounded and sick, burial of the dead, and the transportation of all the material and provisions destined for the use of the troops. To these ends the military and civil authorities of the two contracting parties are bound to render every assistance and service requested by the allied troops.

The payment for the purchases made for the needs of the army of one of the two allied states stationed in the territory of the other, shall be made regularly in cash, at the market price. In exceptional cases payments may be made by vouchers placed at the disposal of the allied army at its request by the proper authorities of the other ally.

The current rate of the Greek and Serbian coin or paper money shall be fixed by a joint agreement of the two allied governments. It goes without saying that in the territories taken from the enemy and occupied by the allied armies, the two contracting parties shall enjoy in regard to the maintenance and the revictualling of their troops the rights conceded by the laws of war.

Each allied army shall enjoy these privileges only in the territory which belongs to its own zone of occupation, as this is indicated in Article 6 of the present convention. The expenses for the transportation of troops, all necessary material in general, war booty, etc., by railways or ships, shall be borne by the contracting state in whose territory such transportations shall be effected.

ARTICLE 11

The war booty shall belong to the allied army which captures it.

In case the booty is captured in a common battle of the allied armies, on the same battle-field, it shall be divided in proportion to the number of fighting men of the two armies who participate in it.

ARTICLE 12

The present convention shall be valid as long as the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains in force.

Article 2 of the present convention may be modified by a joint agreement in writing of the General Staffs of the two respective states, after the passing of the present crisis and the ordering of demobilization.

ARTICLE 13

The present convention shall come into force from the day of its ratification by their Majesties the King of the Hellenes and the King of Serbia, or by the respective governments of the allied states.

In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention.

Done in duplicate, in Salonika, the nineteenth day of May in the year 1913.

For Greece:

X. STRATIGOS.

For Serbia:

Colonel PETAR PECHITCH.

Colonel DOUCHAN TOUFEGDJITCH.

II. NEGOTIATIONS

No. 5

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *May 10/23, 1913.*

We have just received your telegram about the note which the Serbian Government will send to Sofia. Notwithstanding the Bulgarian attack, which is becoming general at Pangaion, we did not wish to take the offensive and march against Serres — which would have compelled the Bulgarians to change their attitude — in order not to find ourselves unexpectedly in a state of war. But the situation can not be protracted, because it is very dangerous and we should come to a decision. The time for the signature of the treaty expires on the 12th of May (O. S.) and it is necessary that it should be signed in Belgrade. You have by telegram the text of the full powers which we shall send to you by special courier. You can sign before it reaches you.

In regard to the modifications to be made in the secret treaty, which are mentioned in your telegram of the 9th instant, accept in Article 5 after the words “to mediation or arbitration” the insertion of the words “of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers or the chiefs of other states.” Accept equally the omission of the words “as soon as possible.” In the same article instead of the wording “the two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to propose, etc.” we prefer the original wording “the two high contracting parties will propose, etc.” As I informed you by my communication of April 30, the change of the verb “will propose” to “reserve to themselves” was due to the omission of the words which we now accept. We also accept that the second paragraph of Article 4 should be worded as follows: “The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow the Axios river, etc.”

In regard to the modifications of the military convention, Article 1, according to your telegrams, should be worded as follows: “In case of war between the two allied states and another state, entered into under the circumstances provided for in Article 5 (the number

is missing in your telegram) of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other — (up to:) all her land forces.” We accept it in the above wording.

In regard to the provisions of Article 6 of the convention, we give you full liberty to negotiate on them, trying to improve them and at last to accept them, if there is no way of doing otherwise. You will have in that the aid of Captain Stratigos. Try to finish as soon as possible.

Offer our thanks to the Serbian Government for its step at Sofia. As soon as it presents a note for the revision, we can accelerate our joint steps, in order to hasten the negotiations of partition.

COROMILAS.

No. 6

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, May 10/23, 1913.

I communicate the following telegram drawn up by Captain Stratigos:

After an understanding with the President of the Ministerial Council and in the presence of Colonel Toufegdjitch, who signed the military convention in Salonika, the Minister of Serbia at Athens handed to us a memorandum containing the modifications proposed by the Serbians in Articles 1 and 6 of the military convention signed in Salonika. He wishes urgently to have an answer on these propositions.

In regard to Article 1, the Serbians propose to modify it as follows: “In case of war between one of the two allied states and a third Power, entered into under the circumstances provided for by Article — of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack.” The remainder is not modified. This article as it was worded at Salonika, is from the military point of view much more advantageous to us, while as it is now worded, it serves only the interests of Serbia. The strictly defensive character of the alliance is to the advantage of the Serbians, who do not claim from the Bulgarians more than what they now possess, while it deprives us of the right to claim all the territory which has been

defined in the protocol to the south of the Kilkitch-Orliaco line, occupied now entirely by the Bulgarians, inasmuch as an advance on our part with the view of occupying these points might be interpreted by the Serbians as a provocation. Besides, this strictly defensive character contributes to leave to Bulgaria every initiative and liberty of action, which from the military point of view is very disadvantageous. The extension of the alliance not only against Bulgaria but also against any third Power is, from the military standpoint, detrimental to our interests and favorable only to the Serbians. In fact, the latter have but land frontiers and have as neighbors more states than we have with whom they could at a given time come into conflict, in which case we would be obliged to assist them; on the contrary, it is only with Bulgaria that we can come in conflict by land and it is in that case only that the help of Serbia could be useful to us. For our eventual differences with other Powers who could attack us by sea, the assistance of Serbia would amount to nothing. So, in order to bring into harmony Article 1st of the military convention with the respective provisions of the treaty of alliance, we venture to suggest that it would perhaps be more advantageous to modify the respective provisions of the treaty of alliance according to the exigencies of our military interest.

As for Article 6 of the military convention the Serbians demand that it be modified as follows:

After the beginning of the hostilities, whatever the course of the military operations may be and whatever the places through which, during the military operations, the troops of one or the other of the allied states pass and whatever may be the cities, villages or localities which may be occupied by these troops for the sake of military necessity, the occupation of the territories situated to the east of the Serbian frontier on the Vardar (Axios) river, as it is determined by the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece, of which the present convention forms a complement, is regulated as follows:

The Greek army has the right to occupy the territories situated to the south and the southeast of the line, which, starting about three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli on the Vardar, proceeds towards the east between the villages Bogoroditcha and Mazucovo, to the north of the village Selimli, to the south of Dautli, and from there ascends up to the altitude 535, it proceeds towards the altitude 420, by Hissar-Tepe; altitude 127, altitude 217, altitude 490, altitude 576, from there by the mountain range of the Kroussa Balkans up to the altitude 645 [to] the Butkova lake and reaches the Strouma river, from which it [words illegible] towards the altitude 1800, to the north of Karakioi, altitudes 2194, 4038, 8994, 8475. The Serbian army has the right to occupy the territories situated to the north of the same line. If during the course of the operations . . . etc.

The Serbians claim this line, as fixed above, alleging that in case of a successful war against Bulgaria, we shall be sufficiently compensated by an extension of our frontier to the east. Such a proposition — which in every other circumstance may be debatable —

should now be rejected, not so much because we shall be deprived of a sufficiently large extent of a rich country, but especially for purely military reasons; for by accepting the line proposed by the Serbians we shall find ourselves, even after a successful war against Bulgaria, deprived of natural and strong boundaries to the north of Salonika, such as Mount Beles would constitute. Mount Beles and, to the east, the narrow pass of Demir Hissar in the hands of another state would give to her the advantage of being able to concentrate against us her army in the valley of Strouma and to advance without hindrance toward the plain of Serres and Salonika. Our occupation of Milovitsa and the narrow pass would oblige it on the contrary to concentrate itself much more to the north and delay greatly its advance, which would be an incalculable benefit and greatly favor a possible operation in that region. Another very great inconvenience offered by the proposed line is that it would deprive us of an entire portion of the Salonika-Serres Railway line, from Kilindir to the Hani-Derven Bridge, on the Strouma. The building of a new railway line from Salonika to Serres beyond the proposed boundaries, would meet great difficulties on account of the very configuration of the ground.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 7

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, May 13/26, 1913.

I communicate to you the following telegram of Captain Stratigos:

The modifications of the military convention, which the Serbians demand, as a result of a study by their General Staff, are as follows:

Article 1. In case of war against one of the two states, entered into, in the circumstances provided for in Article 1 of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack of important masses of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other mutual support, Greece by all her land and naval forces and Serbia by all her land forces.

They demand that this formu'a should be final, and insist that this article should be connected not with the fifth article of the treaty which has in view a war against Bulgaria alone, but with Article 1, which extends the alliance against other states, adding that if it referred only to Bulgaria they would not have needed our alliance. Furthermore, in consequence it seems of the last engagements they add the words "important masses." It seems to me that we can accept this

latter point, provided a clear formula be found capable of avoiding all misunderstanding. As to the connection of this article either with the first or fifth articles of the treaty of alliance, as this constitutes a capital question, I shall await your instructions.

Article 2. They demand that the Greek army shall be increased from 90,000 to 100,000 fighting men. I think that we can accept this modification.

Article 3 unchanged.

Article 4. The Serbians add a second paragraph which is as follows:

But if Serbia, in the case provided for in Article 1, finds herself at the same time under the necessity of defending herself against an attack on the part of another Power than Bulgaria, she will be bound to go to the assistance of Greece, attacked by Bulgaria, with all her available military forces. Conversely, if Greece finds herself under the necessity of defending herself against the attack of a Power other than Bulgaria, she will be bound to go to the assistance of Serbia, attacked by Bulgaria, with all her available military forces.

This addition is acceptable in principle. I have proposed that it should be formulated in a manner insuring a proper use of the military forces according to military necessity and in a manner so as to avoid every cause of abuse.

After this article they propose an article 4 bis:

In case one of the contracting parties should declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without the previous agreement and consent of the other contracting party, the latter will be freed from the obligations imposed by Articles 1 and 2 of the present convention. Still, it should observe a benevolent neutrality towards its ally throughout the duration of the war and be bound to mobilize immediately at least 50,000 fighting men and to concentrate them in a manner so as to protect the freedom of movement of the allied army.

I think that it suits our purpose to accept this article up to the words "throughout the duration of the war."

Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 unchanged.

The discussion on Article 6 will take place tomorrow.

At the end of the convention we shall add: first an article concerning the revictualling, the sanitary service, the transportation of the wounded, the burial of the dead, the transportation of material and provisions, the manner of the payment of the expenses, the exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories, and the manner of regulating the expenses of transportation by sea and railway; and secondly an article concerning the manner of the distribution of the booty.

In order to gain time we shall discuss the above articles with the military delegates and will agree upon a final formula under the reservation of your approval.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 8

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, May 14/27, 1913.

We reply to the two telegrams of Captain Stratigos dated May 10 and 13.

Article 1 of the military convention. We conclude that this article has been finally worded as follows:

In case of war against one of the two states, entered into under the circumstances provided for by their treaty of alliance, or in case of a sudden attack of important masses ("forces" preferably) of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states promise to each other mutual support, Greece with all her land and sea forces and Serbia with all her land forces.

Captain Stratigos had telegraphed that he would define in a clearer manner the words "important masses" in order to avoid all misunderstanding, but he has not communicated to us the modification announced by him. We accept the article in its final formulation under the reservation of formulating more clearly, if necessary, the words "important masses."

Article 2. We have replied that the number of 90,000 for the Greek army should be kept.

Article 3 unchanged.

Article 4. As to the second paragraph "But if Serbia . . ." up to the end "by Bulgaria, by all her available military forces," we accept it in principle, but we would prefer that you give us a better formula insuring a proper utilization of the military forces.

Article 4 bis: "In case one of the two contracting parties should declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without the previous agreement and consent . . ." up to ". . . throughout the duration of the war."

Captain Stratigos has telegraphed that it was not to our interest to accept what comes after this, namely, "and shall be obliged to mobilize immediately at least 50,000 fighting men and to concentrate them in a manner so as to protect the liberty of movement of the allied

army," but he did not inform us what the Serbians had finally accepted. We think that the words "shall be obliged to concentrate — fighting men," etc., might well be placed instead of to "mobilize, etc."

The number of fighting men shall be fixed by the General-in-Chief, taking into consideration that our army will be more numerous in future.

Article 5 unchanged.

Article 6. We have noticed that Captain Stratigos has succeeded in obtaining in our favor an improvement of the line of the military occupation proposed by the Serbians, but he should have fixed it more in detail. We insist that the line, as it shall be finally fixed, shall constitute the eventual frontier between Greece and Serbia. Besides, the Serbians seem to accept it, provided the matter is kept secret, but as compensation for this line they demand that from Karakioi, Serbia may claim a strip of territory along the Nestos of a width of 10 kilometers maximum in order to acquire a port and a railway line of her own to the Ægean Sea. This would constitute a very great advantage for Serbia and in return for this she would perhaps cede to us half of the Doiran lake. This question, too, is worthy of great attention and I shall give you supplementary instructions as to this point.

The other articles unchanged.

We accept in principle the questions dealt with in the two additional articles and are awaiting their formulation.

COROMILAS.

No. 9

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Majesty the King, at Salonika.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, May 14/27, 1913.

I communicate to Your Majesty a telegram sent to Belgrade. I suppose that the Serbian delegates will come to Salonika and that the content of the said telegram may be of use to Captain Metaxas.

I call the attention of Your Majesty to the new demand of Serbia for an outlet to the Ægean. I think that we can accept it on con-

dition that we shall be insured the freedom of passage and the right of way for our railways. The strip of territory should, at any rate, be fixed so as to pass between Xanthi, Yenidje and Gioumouldjina, leaving these three cities outside the Serbian strip [of territory].

COROMILAS.

No. 10

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, May 17/30, 1913.

As the situation is aggravated in consequence of the continued attacks of the Bulgarians, and we are unable to confront them without attacking them elsewhere, the President of the Ministerial Council, in agreement with His Majesty, telegraphs to you to conclude and to sign, if possible, today. If Serbia still insists on the strip of territory, you should accept it as follows:

A strip of territory, of a width of not more than ten kilometers, starting from a point to be fixed on the line Karakioi-Perelik up to the Ægean Sea, passing between Xanthi and Gioumouldjina, is ceded to Serbia, which is to insure to Greece the free passage through it, as well as all the facilities.

Answer at once.

COROMILAS.

III. INTERPRETATION

No. 11

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, at Trieste.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, July 11/24, 1914.

The Chargé d'Affaires of Germany called upon me and read strictly confidentially a telegram from his government, according to which, as the course of events do not seem to exclude a conflict between Austria and Serbia, the Imperial Government will be at the side of its ally. Bulgaria would probably take advantage of such

a situation. It is not known if Turkey will remain indifferent. It would be desirable that Greece should break away from Serbia in time; that, under such circumstances, the conclusion of an alliance with Turkey now would seem to be impracticable, but an arrangement for mutual neutrality would seem to be indicated.

Before I gave an answer to these suggestions, I reserved to myself the right to communicate with Your Excellency and His Majesty whom I shall see this afternoon. I have, however, given assurances that the Royal Government will not fail to act in the sense of the maintenance of peace and, at the same time, I have pointed out the difficulty of our situation in case of the participation of Bulgaria which might perhaps attack Serbia, both in consequence of the obligations assumed [by us] and in view of [the danger of] our being isolated if a similar situation should subsequently present itself to Serbia in a Greco-Bulgarian conflict.

STREIT.

No. 12

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, at Munich.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, *July 12/25, 1914.*

The President of the Council has just begged me to ask you: "Whether the Serbian Government can count on armed aid on the part of Greece: 1st, in case Serbia is attacked by Austria, 2nd in case Serbia is attacked by Bulgaria." A similar question will be put to the Royal Government by the Minister of Serbia in Athens.

The President of the Council has told me that Montenegro will range itself with Serbia in both contingencies, and that Rumania is taking steps to adjust the situation in order to prevent the war between Austria and Serbia, and that she will come to a decision later in case of a European War. His Excellency has added that, according to their last advices from Petersburg, the Ministerial Council in Russia has decided to support Serbia militarily, but that they are awaiting the decision of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 13

*Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

(Telegram)

BERLIN, July 12/25, 1914.

I have just had a very long interview with Von Jagow, who told me that, as soon as he saw that the relations between Austria and Serbia were taking a critical turn, he instructed the representative of Germany at Athens to inform Your Excellency of this situation, and to give us the advice to draw away as much as possible from Serbia, even in case Bulgaria should participate in the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is most probable. I replied that I had knowledge of that communication, having been just informed about it by the President of the Ministerial Council from Munich,¹ and I added that Mr. Venizelos had informed me that in case Bulgaria should think it proper to intervene, Greece could not permit it and that we would also immediately intervene. Von Jagow insisted in a very particular manner on the dangers which he foresaw in the case of the intervention of Greece in order to check Bulgaria. These dangers consist, according to him, in the possibility of seeing Turkey act against us, inasmuch as Serbia would be engaged in fighting Austria, and, on the other hand, the possibility, on which he seems to be counting, of the abstention of Rumania from any interference [in favor] of Serbia, even though attacked by Bulgaria, because Rumania has always tacked about in the waters of the Triple Alliance and she would not at this moment be willing to find herself opposed to Austria and to the Triple Alliance. I insisted on the impossibility of our permitting Bulgaria to change the equilibrium established by the Treaty of Bucharest, and I explained to him that if we permitted such an aggrandizement of Bulgaria, we ran the risk of seeing this Bulgaria become stronger than ourselves and attack us a few years from now. I said at last to Von Jagow that if he wished very much that none of the Balkan States should intervene, he should act at Sofia in order to compel Bulgaria to keep quiet.

I must advise you that from the reserve which I noticed in the language of Von Jagow concerning the action of Bulgaria, I carried

¹ See document No. 11.

away the impression that Austria must have concluded some sort of an agreement with Bulgaria about a common action.

Von Jagow admitted that he fully understood the extremely delicate position in which we would be placed, but he repeated again his advice about abstention and neutrality, even in the case of Bulgarian intervention.

The Minister, reverting to the disposition of Turkey, told me that he was informed from various sources that the military party in Turkey always had far from friendly dispositions towards Greece, and that we should not lose sight of this circumstance.

THEOTOKY.

No. 14

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

MUNICH, July 12/25, 1914.

In regard to our attitude in case of an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia, reserving entirely our opinion on the application of the treaty of alliance, it would be necessary not to leave any doubt in the mind of those with whom you converse about our decision that we shall not stand with crossed arms in the presence of a Bulgarian attack against Serbia. It would be impossible for us to tolerate such an attack, which might result in an aggrandizement of Bulgaria and bring in question the Treaty of Bucharest. It is not only our duty as the ally of Serbia, but an imperative necessity imposed upon us for our own self-preservation.

VENIZELOS.

No. 15

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

MUNICH, July 13/26, 1914.

In regard to the communication made by the President of the Ministerial Council¹ please tell His Excellency that before I give

¹ See document No. 12.

a precise answer, I must come to an understanding with His Majesty the King and the Royal Government.

But, I authorize you to say to His Excellency that I transmitted to you my personal views, authorizing you to speak to him about it in a strictly confidential manner. These are my views: First, as for the contingency of a war between Austria and Serbia, I have the firm hope that such a war, which would be a real calamity for all of us, may be avoided, thanks to the well-known conciliatory spirit of His Excellency, strengthened by the advice of Russia and by that of all the real friends of Serbia; but if, by misfortune, the war broke out, we would take a decision as soon as we became cognisant of all the elements, taking into account the efficiency of our aid. Second, in regard to the contingency of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, I am resolved to propose to His Majesty the King and to the Royal Government to array all our forces against Bulgaria, in order to relieve Serbia from every anxiety about the Bulgarian danger and to insure the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest.

VENIZELOS.

No. 16

*Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky,
Minister of Greece at Berlin.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, July 15/28, 1914.

Referring to your telegram of the 12th instant¹ I have the honor to inform you that I have had a conversation with the Chargé d'Affaires of Germany, in the course of which I have explained to him that a possible interference of Bulgaria in the Austro-Serbian conflict would create for Greece the duty to oppose this by all means. If, in fact, Bulgaria, notwithstanding the declarations of Mr. Rodoslavof, should be led to take advantage of the position of Serbia in order to attack her, there would follow a real upsetting of the equilibrium of the forces in the Balkans and Greece would be in danger of being encircled and exposed to attack on the first occasion. The most elementary sentiment of self-preservation and security impels Greece not to tolerate an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria in order to reopen questions which have already been solved by the Treaty of Bucharest.

¹ See document No. 12.

Please take advantage of the first opportunity which presents itself to speak to this effect to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

STREIT.

No. 17

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

MUNICH, July 16/29, 1914.

At the moment when the declaration of war by Austria obliges us to face serious contingencies, I think that I must indicate to you certain guiding views.

If in a war localized between Serbia and Austria, we can remain neutral, we should not forget that our alliance obliges us to mobilize immediately forty thousand men. Still, it is in the common interest of Serbia and Greece not to proceed immediately to such a step which might provoke the general mobilization of Bulgaria and greatly risk the precipitation of some very grave events. Please give at once the necessary instructions to our minister so that he may explain to the Serbian Government the reasons for our attitude and give to it the repeated assurance of our firm resolution to mobilize immediately in case of a Bulgarian mobilization. He should add that our attitude corresponds absolutely to that which the Serbian Government had decided to take, in the common interest, at the time of our crisis with Turkey.

I am at the same time of the opinion that the coöperation of Greece and Rumania should have an immediate manifestation at Sofia, by an identical declaration of the two Cabinets that they are resolved to mobilize without delay in case of Bulgarian mobilization. Please come to an understanding with Bucharest in order that joint instructions may be given to the above effect to the respective ministers.

Besides, we should consider the possibility of a generalization of the war in order to determine beforehand our policy. My well considered opinion is that, in such a contingency, the Royal Government could at no price whatever, be induced to range itself with the camp opposed to Serbia and coöperate with her enemies against her; that would be contrary to the vital interests of Greece, the

good faith of the treaties and the dignity of the state. I shall under no pretext whatever deviate from this policy.

VENIZELOS.

No. 18

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nisch (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, July 20/August 2, 1914.

In regard to the questions put by the Serbian Government concerning the attitude which the Royal Government intended to take in the Austro-Serbian conflict,¹ please make the following declaration to the President of the Ministerial Council, a copy of which you are authorized to leave with him should he request you to do so:

Without entering into an examination of the obligations resulting from its alliance with Serbia, the sole consideration that the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia are an essential factor in the Balkan equilibrium as established by the Treaty of Bucharest, to the maintenance of which Greece is firmly and resolutely attached, is sufficient to dictate to the Royal Government the decision which it should take, at least for the present, in order to come more effectively to the aid of the friendly and allied nation.

The Royal Government is convinced that it fully discharges its duty as friend and ally by the decision that it has taken to maintain towards Serbia a most benevolent neutrality and to be ready to repel every attack on the part of Bulgaria of which Serbia might be the object.

In fact, the participation of Greece in the war which is being waged, far from being useful to Serbia, would in fact be very prejudicial to her. Greece by becoming belligerent would offer to her ally but very feeble forces in comparison with the power of her adversary, while she would necessarily condemn Serbia to see Salonika, the only open port through which she [Serbia] is revictualled, become the object of the resolute attacks of Austria.

Furthermore, the entrance of Greece into the war would fatally weaken the force of her army, which it is important in the common interest to maintain intact in order to hold Bulgaria in check.

¹ See document No. 12.

The Royal Government is convinced that the Serbian Government will recognize that its decision is inspired by real anxiety for their common interests and that it bears the stamp of the greatest wisdom.

The Royal Government repeats that it is ready to face the danger of a Bulgarian attack. It has already taken all the proper steps to facilitate, if the case requires, the mobilization of its army. If it has not yet mobilized, it is only in order not to provoke in Bulgaria a similar measure, which would undoubtedly precipitate events by complicating the present state of affairs without any advantage. Besides, the Greek mobilization will be finished, when the time comes, if not sooner, at least simultaneously with that of Bulgaria.

The Royal Government hopes that its views on this subject agree absolutely with those of the Serbian Government, which, if the case requires, will kindly communicate to us its opinion.

STREIT.

No. 19

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, July 22/August 4, 1914.

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany has just telegraphed to me asking me to go and see him immediately. As soon as I was ushered in, His Majesty handed me a telegram to read which he had just received from Your Majesty transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires of Germany. His Majesty the Emperor asked me to telegraph at once to Your Majesty the following:

The Emperor informs Your Majesty that an alliance has been today concluded between Germany and Turkey; that Bulgaria and Rumania are equally ranging themselves on the side of Germany; that the German ships which are in the Mediterranean will be joined with the Turkish fleet in order to act together. From the above Your Majesty will see that all the Balkan States have sided with Germany in the struggle which has been undertaken against Slavism. His Majesty in bringing these considerations to the knowledge of Your Majesty begs you, appealing to a comrade, a German Marshal,—of whom the German army felt proud when that title was bestowed upon you,—and to a brother-in-law, and reminding you that it was thanks to the

support of His Imperial Majesty that Greece retained Cavalla definitely, to be pleased to order the mobilization of your army; to place yourself at the side of the Emperor and to march together, hand in hand, against Slavism, the common enemy. The Emperor added that he is making this last and earnest appeal to Your Majesty, at this most critical moment, and that he is convinced that Your Majesty will respond to his appeal. If Greece does not side with Germany then there will be a complete break between Greece and the Empire.

Finally, His Majesty told me that what he asks of you is to put into execution what Your Majesty and he had so many times discussed. He observed to me that since the Bulgarians, to whom the Emperor and Germany had never been very [favorable], are siding with Germany, he can still hope that Greece will likewise do so.

I think I must add that the Emperor appeared to me absolutely determined in what he told me.

THEOTOKY.

No. 20

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, July 22/August 4, 1914.

After having seen the Emperor I had a long conversation with Von Jagow, who confirmed to me, under the seal of absolute secrecy, the conclusion of an alliance between Turkey and Germany. The Turkish troops will be under the high command of the Sultan and the Turkish generals, but General Liman will intervene in their direction. Bulgaria and Rumania will fight on the side of Germany. Between Turkey and Bulgaria there exists a sure understanding, thanks to which these two countries will fight against every state which does not follow the same policy. Von Jagow is of opinion that our security [imposes] upon us to fight with the other Balkan States against Russia and Serbia. On my pointing out to him the danger of a *coup de main* on the part of England to which we are exposed by reason of our geographical situation, he replied that he did not think that England would act against us.

From what I have been able to understand, the negotiations with Bulgaria are conducted in Vienna. In regard to compensations, I

have gained the impression that these are to be looked for in Serbia and Albania in case Italy maintains the reserve which she is now observing. I do not think that Vienna and Sophia have exactly agreed on the compensations which will be accorded to Bulgaria in case of success, and I have reason to believe that these have been simply outlined by the general term of "countries upon which Bulgaria has historical and ethnological rights."

If we decide to accede to the appeal of the Emperor, I think that we ought, after declaring that, in principle, we are ready to comply with that appeal, to demand precise statements as to what they wish us to do, and as to what they would secure for us in case of success. I have the impression that they would not object at all to see us aggrandized at the expense of Serbia.

I beseech you to weigh in a most careful manner the immense consequences, for the present and for the future, which a refusal on our part to accede to the appeal of the Emperor would entail.

THEOTOKY.

No. 21

*Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky,
Minister of Greece in Berlin.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, July 25/August 7, 1914.

I communicate to you the following telegram of His Majesty the King:

Please transmit the following, in answer to your telegram of July 22¹:

The Emperor knows that my personal sympathies and my political views draw me to his side. I shall never forget that it is to him that we owe Cavalla. After mature reflection, however, it is impossible for me to see how I could be useful to him, if I mobilized my army immediately. The Mediterranean is at the mercy of the united fleets of England and France. They would destroy our fleet and our merchant marine, occupy our islands and especially would prevent the concentration of my army which can only be effected by sea because there does not yet exist any railway. Without being able to be useful to him in anything, we would be wiped off the map. I am necessarily of opinion that neutrality is imposed upon us, (and this could also be useful to him), with the assurance that I shall not touch his friends, my neighbors, as long as they do not touch our local Balkan interests.

CONSTANTINE R.

¹ See document No. 19.

STREIT.

No. 22

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, July 25/August 7, 1914.

The news which you give me from Constantinople may be accurate as far as the present is concerned, but this does not preclude that, notwithstanding the assurances which the Turks now give concerning their mobilization, they are pursuing the object indicated by my telegram to His Majesty. One should not lose sight of the fact that Turkey needs a whole month in order to mobilize and that she must do everything possible not to be disturbed in that. Her situation in the Balkans will present itself, as I had the honor of describing it to you, namely: Bulgaria will at a given moment march against Serbia. She will not be prevented by Rumania and will be insured against a possible attack by Turkey, so that, if Germany and Austria are victorious over Russia, it is incontestable that Bulgaria will be aggrandized at the expense of Serbia, and Rumania at that of Russia. That being so, have we an interest in watching this aggrandizement, which we can not prevent, without trying to aggrandize ourselves also? I do not think so. The only way to succeed would be to attack the Serbians together with the Bulgarians, and, if Germany and Austria are victorious, the Serbians will be so reduced that they will never be able to recover. We must try to come to an understanding for that purpose with the Bulgarians, to remain neutral as long as they also do so and to act as soon as they act. If we try to find [illegible words] we shall run the risk of being supplanted by all the others.

I think that such a policy would be perfectly comprehensible here, where they have no reason whatever to spare Serbia, which has today declared war against Germany. Furthermore, in view of the attitude which Italy maintains towards Germany and Austria, I am of opinion that, if an understanding is reached with Vienna, Berlin would have no objection whatever to our receiving compensations in Albania, for with a non-existing Serbia, the reasons which have contributed to its [Albania's] creation and maintenance will cease to exist for Austria.

Of course, I fully understand the scruples which such a policy

would inspire in you in regard to the relations that we have with Serbia; but it is now a question of our existence, and of our profiting as much as possible from the general upheaval.

THEOTOKY.

No. 23

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, July 27/August 9, 1914.

I transmitted through Von Jagow to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany the telegram which Your Majesty has done me the honor to send under date of July 25.¹ Von Jagow told me that he thinks that the Emperor will understand the necessity indicated by Your Majesty to maintain neutrality for the present. The minister repeated to me the advice which he gave the day before yesterday, that we should come to an understanding, as soon as possible, with Sofia and Constantinople, and added that Serbia was now considered "the bear's skin."

THEOTOKY.

No. 24

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, July 29/August 11, 1914.

I have just had a long interview with Mr. Zimmermann, which may be summarized as follows:

The Under Secretary of State thinks that Rumania does not care about the Treaty of Bucharest except in so far as that treaty concerns her. Bulgaria and Turkey are already linked together. Bulgaria will act at the favorable moment against Serbia. As for Turkey, he counts on her acting against Russia. Mr. Zimmermann does not exclude the possibility of Turkey and Bulgaria attacking us also, if we attempt to check the attack of Bulgaria against Serbia. As you see, we are isolated.

¹ See document No. 21.

Mr. Zimmermann expresses also the opinion that we must try to come to an understanding with Sofia and Constantinople, although the thing seems to him to be very difficult. If an understanding can be reached, we must remain neutral as long as the others remain so and act as soon as they act, having Serbia as the objective. If this is not done, the only thing left to us is to maintain neutrality. The Under Secretary is of opinion that as soon as the German troops have achieved one or two great victories against France, the Balkan States will act.

THEOTOKY.

No. 25

*Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky,
Minister of Greece at Berlin.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, July 30/August 12, 1914.

I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Germany came today to speak to me again about the possibility, which His Excellency considered as being imminent, of an attack by Bulgaria against Serbia, and of the attitude which Greece should from now on take in order that she may release herself from Serbia. His Excellency furthermore demanded that Greece should, in any case, maintain neutrality and not come to the assistance of Serbia; that, in case Bulgaria while attacking Serbia was attacked by Greece, he would be obliged to demand his passports and to leave his post in order to show that he considers such an action of the Royal Government as hostile.

I replied to the Minister of Germany that I should have to consider the declaration about the possibility of the rupture of the relation with Greece as not corresponding to the present situation, because such a contingency has not yet presented itself, and that according to our information, there is not yet even a Bulgarian mobilization. If Bulgaria mobilized, we would also do so immediately, and that independently of the attitude which we would take, because otherwise Bulgaria could take advantage of it in order to attack us.

I developed afterwards at length the point of view which you know, and according to which, if we impose upon Bulgaria the maintenance of neutrality, this action has only in view our primordial right of self-preservation, has a purely Balkan character, and is not directed against the two Central Powers, one of which, namely, Austria-Hungary, has

today declared to us that she is exercising in the same sense a pressure at Sofia.

I added as my personal opinion that it seemed to me that the Bulgarian mobilization should be avoided in the interests of the Central Powers themselves, because Bulgarian duplicity being known, the probability is not at all excluded that Bulgaria, once mobilized, may be carried away by the Russophile current to take sides with the Triple Entente, finding it to her interest to come to an understanding with Serbia.

Please add these arguments to the ones I have already communicated to you in my previous dispatch, and do not lose sight of the fact that the German Government, in approving our neutrality, does not demand from us at this moment to march with Bulgaria against Serbia.

Please ascertain also if the above declaration about the rupture of the relations with Greece reflects in fact the view of the German Government.

STREIT.

No. 26

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations in the countries of the Entente Powers and in Bucharest.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, August 31/September 13, 1914.

The Minister of Germany came to see me in order to tell me that an agreement has been definitely reached between Bulgaria and Turkey. The latter will lend Bulgaria two army corps, with a view to a joint attack against Serbia, and will maintain four army corps in Thrace by way of threat against a possible attack of Rumania upon Bulgaria. The Minister of Germany told me that neither Bulgaria nor Turkey intended to attack Greece.

I replied to the Minister of Germany that, as I had already declared to him, it would be impossible for Greece to be a passive spectator of an attack by Turkey and Bulgaria upon Serbia, and that apart from her interests, her obligations as ally oblige her to go to the defense of Serbia in case the action announced should be realized.

It is not impossible that the Minister of Germany made this communication to me in order to obtain a promise of neutrality on the part of Greece, which the German Government would utilize at Sofia

in order to ask Bulgaria to come to an understanding with Turkey for the purpose of a joint attack against Serbia.

Please make the above known without delay and confidentially to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and telegraph to me his impression.

VENIZELOS.

No. 27

*Mr. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. E. Venizelos,
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

(Telegram)

BERLIN, October 18/31, 1914.

This morning I had a conversation with Mr. Zimmermann, which may be summarized as follows:

The German Government seems to be satisfied that events have obliged Russia to declare war against Turkey, for it hopes that the state of war, which will necessarily extend to France and England, will contribute, on the one hand, to the diversion of the Russian forces from their principal objective, namely, Germany and Austria, and on the other hand, it hopes that owing to the state of war, Turkey will be able to declare a sacred war in Asia, in India and in Africa, and that the rising of the Islamic world will embarrass France and particularly England, which might fear for her position in Egypt and India.

In regard to us, the Under Secretary of State gave me again the most categorical assurance that Turkey is not thinking of attacking us and that the German interests require that Turkey should limit herself to waging war against Russia. He therefore advises us to remain passive spectators in this struggle.

As for Bulgaria, Mr. Zimmermann thinks that she will not intervene for the present and he expressed the opinion that, even should Bulgaria intervene later against Serbia, we would have every interest not to intervene. Having observed to him that we have a treaty with Serbia, he answered that today treaties have very little value, and he mentioned the small importance which the treaties binding Germany and Austria to Italy and to Rumania have exercised on the attitude which these last two Powers have followed from the beginning of the war. "Try to make," concluded the Under Secretary of State, "your links with Serbia as loose as possible."

THEOTOKY.

No. 28

Communiqué of the Gounaris Cabinet given to the press on February 25/March 10, 1915, the day that it assumed power.

Greece, after her victorious wars, had the imperative need of a long period of peace in order to work for the prosperity of the country. The organization of the public services, of the land and sea forces, and the development of the public wealth would have guaranteed her against any attack on what she had acquired at so much sacrifice. They would also have permitted her to put into execution a program serving the interests of the state and to adopt a policy in conformity with the national traditions.

Under these circumstances, neutrality from the beginning of the war was a necessity for Greece. She had and always has the absolute duty to carry out her obligations of alliance and to pursue the satisfaction of her interests, without however running the danger of compromising the integrity of her territory.

The Greek Government, conscious of its duty thus to serve the interests of the country, is convinced that the patriotism of the people will insure the entire preservation of these interests.

No. 29

Mr. G. Christaki-Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nish (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, February 28/March 13, 1915.

After the official communiqué which was published on the assumption of power by the new Cabinet,¹ I instructed our representatives at London, Paris and St. Petersburg, to give to the respective governments categorical assurances that the new Cabinet would follow the policy inaugurated by Greece from the beginning of the present war, and that in no way was it intending to deviate from a line of conduct traced by its traditional sentiments, the bonds which unite her with the Protecting Powers and her vital interests. The divergences which brought about the recent crisis had to do with the dangers of an im-

¹ See document No. 28.

mediate action, but do not touch the basis of our policy. I have expressed the same opinion to the Minister of Serbia at Athens, adding that the Royal Government is thoroughly conscious of the community of interests existing between the two allied and friendly countries and that it has always been faithfully attached to the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia.

Please see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and speak to him to this effect in order to dispel any uneasiness which may have arisen in his mind in consequence of the change of government in Greece.

ZOGRAPHOS.

No. 30

Mr. P. Psychas, Minister of Greece at Bucharest, to Mr. D. Gounaris, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BUCHAREST, July 17/30, 1915.

My English colleague has told me that according to positive information, Germany has given formal assurances to the Government of Sofia that the neutrality of Greece was definitely secured, even in case of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria.

PSYCHAS.

No. 31

Telegraphic Circular of Mr. D. Gounaris, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Nisch (Serbia), Berlin, Vienna and Sofia.¹

ATHENS, July 20/August 2, 1915.

I communicate to you herewith a telegram of our Bucharest Legation² and I beg you, in case similar language is used to you to repeat what we have so often declared, that a Bulgarian attack against Serbia could not leave us indifferent, and that the Bulgaro-Turkish agreement will only strengthen the bonds between the two countries.

GOUNARIS.

¹ This circular was communicated to the Minister of Greece at Bucharest.

² See document No. 30.

No. 32

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, August 21/September 3, 1915.

The prospect of a possible attack against Serbia by the combined Austro-German forces continues to preoccupy intensely the Royal Government and this on account of the more and more evident *rapprochement* between Bulgaria and the Central Empires. If this *rapprochement* had no other effect than to insure to the Teutonic forces a free passage through Bulgaria, we would have no reason whatever to be alarmed. But if, taking advantage of the arrival of Teutonic forces, Bulgaria should undertake to attack Serbia, we could not remain indifferent to the prospect of a probable crushing of our ally by Bulgaria. Independently of the extent of our obligations of alliance, our vital interest would compel us to do everything in order to forestall a Bulgarian victory, of which we would become, sooner or later, the first victims.

The German Government will undoubtedly have in view these various contingencies in deciding upon the expedition through Bulgaria, but you would do well to seize a favorable opportunity in order to give again an explanation of these views in your private character, by saying that they represent the opinion predominating in the country. We think that the German Government has no interest in seeing the outbreak of a Balkan War and will continue to wish that Greece may not abandon her neutrality. We may therefore hope that, in any case, even in case the eastern expedition is organized, it will use all its influence to check Bulgaria, dissuading her from any attack on Serbia in order to insure the maintenance of peace on our own frontiers.

Please transmit without delay the result of your steps.

VENIZELOS.

No. 33

Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Legations.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, September 25/October 8, 1915.

The new Cabinet, having studied the various aspects of the exceedingly complicated international situation before which it now finds itself, is in a position to affirm that its policy will rest on the same essential bases as the policy followed by Greece from the beginning of the European War. Greece, in order the better to insure her vital interests, will remain in a state of armed neutrality and will adapt herself to events, the evolution of which the new Cabinet will follow with unabated attention.

Please be guided by the above both in your diplomatic conversations and interviews with the representatives of the press.

ZAÏMIS.

No. 34

Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nish (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, September 29/October 12, 1915.

The Minister of Serbia left with me a copy of a telegram from his government, which, considering that the expectation of an impending attack of the Bulgarian forces against the Serbian army constitutes the *casus foederis* provided for by our alliance, requests us to inform it at once if, in accordance with our agreements, the Greek army will be ready to act against Bulgaria, and if the Royal Government will be disposed to give to the General Staff the necessary instructions to come to an understanding with the Serbian Staff in order to determine the details of the plan for a coöperation against Bulgaria.

The Royal Government regrets exceedingly that it can not accede to the demand of the Serbian Government formulated in that manner.

In the first place, it considers that in the present circumstances, the *casus foederis* does not arise. In fact, the alliance which was concluded in the year 1913 in anticipation of a Bulgarian attack and with the view of establishing and maintaining an equilibrium of forces between the States of the Peninsula after the partition of the territories obtained by joint conquest from the Ottoman Empire, has, according to the very preamble of the treaty, a purely Balkan character, imposing in no way the application of the treaty in the contingency of a general conflagration. In spite of the generality of the terms of article first, the treaty of alliance and the military convention which completes it, prove that the contracting parties had in view only the hypothesis of a singlehanded attack by Bulgaria directed against one of them. Article 4 of the military convention furnishes in itself the proof of this, because being intended to limit the aid of one of the allies already occupied elsewhere, it does not foresee any other *casus foederis* but the attack of Bulgaria against the other ally. Nowhere is there any question of a combined attack of two or more Powers. On the contrary, no matter how broad the general provision of the first article of the military convention may be in its terms, it is limited to the hypothesis of a war between one of the two allied states and a single other Power. And it could not have been otherwise; it would have been an act of foolish conceit in the event that one of the parties would be at war with several states at the same time, to stipulate the granting of an evidently feeble and ridiculous assistance of the military forces of the other party.

It is therefore beyond question that exactly this hypothesis now presents itself. If the Bulgarian attack feared by the Serbian Government takes place, it will be due to an agreement made with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. It will be carried out in combination with the attack already undertaken against Serbia by the two Central Empires. It will appear as an incident of the European War. The Serbian Government itself has already recognized that this was the character of the attack by breaking her diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in order to follow the example of the Entente Powers, her European allies, without previously coming to an understanding with Greece, her Balkan ally. It is therefore evident that the attack will be found to be outside the provisions as well as the spirit of our alliance.

But the Royal Government is not only convinced that under these

circumstances it is not bound by any contractual obligation, but it is also persuaded that its military assistance offered spontaneously at such a time would badly serve the common interest of both countries. It is on account of this interest that it has remained neutral in the European War, believing that the best service which it could render to Serbia was to hold Bulgaria in check, preserving its forces intact and its communications free in view of a possible attack on her part. It was always ready to face the Bulgarian danger even in case it should appear in the course of the European War, although Serbia was already struggling with two great Powers. For that reason, it hastened immediately to answer the Bulgarian mobilization by a general mobilization of its army. But it had always in view a Bulgarian attack undertaken separately, even though in connection with the other hostilities undertaken against Serbia. The hypothesis of an attack concerted with that of other Powers was and ought to be outside of its anticipations; because Greece, intervening in such a case, would have been lost, without having the least hope of saving Serbia. Evidently, Serbia can not desire such a result. The common interest requires, on the contrary, that the Greek forces should be kept in reserve for a better use of them subsequently. It is therefore of importance that Greece should remain neutral and under arms and should follow attentively the march of events, with the resolution always, and by the most appropriate means, to watch over the preservation of her own vital interests and the protection of the interests which she has in common with Serbia.

The Royal Government, being convinced that the Serbian Government will recognize the correctness of the reasons which prevent Greece, in the present circumstances, from promising its armed assistance to Serbia, and feeling a profound regret for the actual impossibility, for the present, of doing more for Serbia, wishes to assure her, that faithful to their friendship, she will continue to give her all the aid and facilities compatible with her international position.

Please read the above to Mr. Pachitch, leaving with him a copy if he asks for it.

ZAÏMIS.

No. 35

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Legations.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, October 26/November 8, 1915.

The new Cabinet intends to follow in foreign affairs exactly the same policy as its predecessor. I am referring, in regard to this, to the dispatch of my predecessor of September 25th.¹ In your diplomatic conversations with the representatives of the press, please be inspired by the declarations therein contained.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 36

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Panourias, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Mitrovitsa (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, October 26/November 8, 1915.

In speaking to the Serbian Government, please give the most categorical assurances of the sentiments of sincere friendship with which we are animated toward Serbia, as well as of our firm resolution to continue to afford her all the facilities and every support compatible with our vital interests.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 37

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, October 26/November 8, 1915.

In speaking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs please give on my behalf the most categorical assurance of our firm resolution to continue our neutrality with the character of the sincerest benevolence

¹ See document No. 33.

towards the Entente Powers. Please add that the new Cabinet adopts as its own the repeated declarations of Mr. Zaïmis about the friendly attitude of the Royal Government towards the Allied troops in Salonika; that it is too conscious of its real interests and of what it owes to the Protecting Powers of Greece to deviate in the least from this line of conduct. It therefore hopes that the sentiments of friendship of these Powers for Greece will not at any time be influenced by the malicious and misleading news which is circulated intentionally in the vain hope of impairing the good relations of the Entente with Greece.

SKOULODIS.

No. 38

Mr. J. Panourias, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece in Serbia, to Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

MITROVITSA, November 2/15, 1915.

I duly spoke to the President of the Ministerial Council according to the import of your telegram of the 26th ultimo¹ received late yesterday evening, telling him of the declarations contained in the telegram of September 25th.² I developed again the arguments supporting our point of view. The President of the Council thanked me for the communication and added that the vital interests of Greece are identical with those of Serbia, that the aggrandizement of Bulgaria would be the ruin both of Serbia and of Greece, that the victory of the Austro-Germans could by no means guarantee the vital interests of Greece, and that he has the firm hope that Greece will intervene at the last moment.

I also had a conversation to the same import with the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me nearly the same thing as the President of the Council, and communicated to me, — justifying himself for the delay due to the march of events, — the reply of the Serbian Government given by [illegible words] on the foreign policy of the Zaïmis Cabinet.

Here is the text of this reply:

¹ See document No. 36.

² See document No. 33.

"At the end of September last, the Minister of Greece in Serbia delivered to the Serbian Government a copy of a telegram from his government¹ in which Greece, in reply to the appeal made to her by Serbia at the moment when the Bulgarian attack against Serbia was impending, declared that she regretted that she was not able to give a favorable answer to our appeal to intervene against Bulgaria as soon as the latter should attack Serbia.

The reasons given by Greece in that reply were, that she considered that such a possible attack by Bulgaria at the present moment came under the contingencies of the European War and that in no case could it constitute a *casus foederis*, the Greco-Serbian alliance having a purely Balkan character.

The Serbian Government, being solely inspired by the solidarity of the vital interests of Greece and Serbia in the face of the Bulgarian danger, — the importance of which is also recognized by Greece in her reply, — considers that it is its duty to submit to the Greek Government the arguments which militate in favor of immediate action by Greece against Bulgaria. The spirit of the treaty of alliance, which guarantees the territorial integrity of each of the contracting states in case of attack, as well as its text, in which no mention is made that the treaty will cease to have binding force if Bulgaria is in alliance with another Power, prove in a clear and logical manner that Greece is bound to come to the assistance of Serbia, if the latter, without provocation on her part, is attacked by Bulgaria or another Power. The Serbian Government has not the slightest doubt that Bulgaria is attacking Serbia solely for the purpose of taking away from her the territories which she acquired by the Treaties of London and Bucharest, and in order to prevent Serbia and Greece from having contiguous frontiers. The object of the treaty of alliance with Serbia is to guarantee the situation which was created after the wars in the Balkan Peninsula, and this treaty has the character of a treaty of mutual guarantee of the integrity of Serbia and Greece. (Article 1st) This article, in fact, does not state that Serbia and Greece must be attacked by one enemy only and not by many; it speaks of an attack in general and not of the number of the attacking Powers. To suppose that the treaty foresaw the case of the attack of one Power only and not of more, would mean that the treaty was intended to guarantee Greece and Serbia against the lesser danger but not against the greatest dangers. It therefore results from this interpretation that the application of the treaty would cease to have binding force precisely at the moment when it was most necessary.

The attack of Bulgaria against Serbia shows, according to the opinion of the Serbian Government, the evident intention of changing the existing situation in the Balkans. But even if it had been only

¹ See document No. 34.

an incident in the present European War and not an event of a preëminently Balkan character, the important question would have been not to know what is the character of this war, but what is its object and what are the consequences which may result from it? Whether the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans is changed through a purely Balkan war, or through a combined European and Balkan war, amounts to the same thing. In either case the Greco-Serbian interests are equally injured. [The disadvantage offered by the possibility] of a combined attack of Germans and Bulgarians against Serbia is [counterbalanced] by the military aid of the Powers of the Triple Entente, who have as their object the maintenance of the situation which was created and guaranteed by the Treaty of Bucharest.

Serbia in breaking diplomatic relations with Bulgaria without previously coming to an understanding with Greece, did not wish to recognize the European character of the possible Bulgarian attack; she wished only to characterize the Bulgarian mobilization as being directed against Serbia and [to consider it as] a menace to her existence. She did not come to an understanding with Greece in regard to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria for the simple reason that she did not have the choice and it did not depend upon her to break or to maintain those relations. The rupture became inevitable on account of the aggressive attitude of Bulgaria. Therefore, we think that Greece, having ordered without a previous understanding with Serbia the general mobilization of her army immediately after the Bulgarian general mobilization, has [acted] in the same [manner as Serbia].

Greece herself recognizes that the present Serbo-Bulgarian war may endanger her own interests, and for that reason she promises to intervene at a favorable time, as much for the guarantee of our common interests as for her own special interests; but, according to the opinion of the Greek Government, this intervention, in order to become effective, must be made at a favorable time. The Greek Government then admits that it may intervene in the present war against the Bulgarian danger, which might present itself during the European War; it [admits] consequently the [possibility] of an intervention against two adversaries of Serbia, but only if their attack against Serbia is simultaneous and not combined, which from the military standpoint is the same thing. Whether therefore her adversaries are allies or not, Serbia is bound to fight on two fronts and the military difficulties for Greece are the same.

[However], the Greek Government recognizing the possibility of its intervention during this war, considers that this intervention, should take place at the opportune moment. It is more than evident that Serbia and Greece, joining their forces, could defeat the Bulgarians even if the latter were aided by the Germans, more easily than Greece, if isolated, could defeat a Bulgaro-German coalition, to which she would have previously given time to defeat Serbia.

Greece by her present attitude gives to this coalition the opportunity of subduing first Serbia and afterwards Greece, while it is certain that it could not vanquish them simultaneously.

Having in view all the above [arguments] and the common [Greco-Serbian] interests, [the Serbian Government] begs to draw the attention of the Greek Government to the fact that Greece has repeatedly given to us the assurance that she would take part in the war, under the reservation only that Bulgaria must first attack Serbia. [The very interest] of Greece imposes upon her the duty of beginning operations immediately against Bulgaria with all her forces, even if no Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance existed. Any delay in the intervention of Greece may become fatal not only to Serbia but also to Greece. The Serbian Government therefore makes a final appeal to the Greek Government in order that this intervention may be effected immediately."

PANOURIAS.

No. 39

*Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. E. Skouloudis
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

(Telegram)

PARIS, March 28/April 10, 1916.

I have the honor to inform you that the rejection by the Royal Government of the proposals of the British and French Ministers concerning the question of facilitating [the passage] of the Serbian army through our territory, which came to the knowledge of the Ministry many days ago, has disposed the French Government very unfavorably toward us. Mr. Briand told me that under these conditions there could no longer be any question of furnishing to us an advance of 150 millions asked for by the Royal Government. The commissary officer Bonnier told me the same thing in regard to the army supplies. For three days the newspapers, particularly the *Echo de Paris*, have published very violent articles, and news suggesting a blockade and other coercive measures on account of the attitude of Greece in general, without referring to the question of the passage of the Serbian troops. I have asked a well informed journalist, an acquaintance of mine, the reason for this campaign. He told me that this language of the French press is due to our refusal to allow the passage to the Serbians. They avoid, however, for the moment, speaking about the question of the passage of the [Serbian army], because, if the public were informed

about it, there would be a general reprobation of us and the French Government would perhaps be obliged to adopt an attitude which is repugnant to Mr. Briand, who desires to maintain friendly relations between the two countries. The President of the Council would like to have the Serbians transported by sea around the Matapan promontory, but the Minister of Marine is opposed to it, because he considers the passage as dangerous and difficult on account of the submarines. It can not be denied that if a Serbian transport were sunk, public opinion would throw the responsibility for it upon us.

ROMANOS.

No. 40

*Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris.*¹

(Telegram)

ATHENS, March 29/April 11, 1916.

I can not but be painfully surprised by the declaration of Mr. Briand that, on account of the point of view of the Royal Government in the matter of the passage of the Serbian army, there can no longer be any question of giving to us the advance of the 150 millions which we had asked. In fact, we did not ask this advance as a price for the violation of neutrality, to which we never thought of consenting, and nothing in our attitude can permit the French Government to attach such a meaning to our request. We asked the financial assistance of the Western Powers, thinking rightly that it could not be a matter of indifference to them to see Greece weakened militarily and disorganized financially. This point of view was certainly preoccupying the Powers because they did not oppose to our request any refusal of acceptance in principle. Under these circumstances, the difficulty which has now arisen does not seem to be of a nature to alter the position of the financial matter, unless Mr. Briand intends to set aside deliberately considerations of a general and permanent order, in order to inflict upon Greece a sort of punishment for her refusal to consent to a serious violation of her neutrality. This conclusion is so illogical and iniquitous that it is impossible that it can be definitively

¹ This telegram was communicated to the Royal Legations at London, Rome, and Petrograd.

reached by a mind so penetrating and liberal as that of Mr. Briand, and this all the more because he is too keen not to perceive that, if Greece, wishing to remain neutral, is obliged to repulse energetically every new violation of her neutrality, she does not possess the necessary means to resist the pressure of a coalition of great Powers. There are many things that Greece has had to submit to or endure because she could not help herself and the Powers already know this, from long experience. There are others which, on account of the rapidity of their execution and the fact that they are less annoying to our country, escape the action and even the vigilance of the authorities. Thus, in the very matter which had so excited the Powers, something has just happened which confirms the experience of the past, because Sunday evening the French transport *Jean Corbiere*, carrying Serbian detachments from Corfu to Salonika, passed through the canal of Corinth, almost completely unobserved, thanks to its innocent exterior.

Please be guided by the above, and have a semi-official and friendly conversation with Mr. Briand, in which you will not have any trouble in making him understand that Greece, being placed between two groups of Powers, is obliged to submit to the recriminations, the protests and the bad humor of the one, whenever her neutrality is in fact violated in favor of the other, and that, under these conditions, it is impossible for the Royal Government to maintain officially an attitude different from her present attitude.

SKOULODIS.

No. 41

Note-verbale of the Serbian Government to the Hellenic Government communicated by Mr. J. Balougdjitch, Minister of Serbia at Athens.

ATHENS, April 7/20, 1916.

In order that the transportation to Salonika of the Serbian troops, now in Corfu, may be effected as soon as possible (which is undoubtedly also the desire of the Greek Government) and with the least possible risk (this being the principal anxiety of the Serbian Government) it is necessary that the transportation should be done by land from Patras.

The Serbian Government appeals first of all to the sentiments of humanity of the Hellenic Government, and begs that it may permit this passage; because, although there are other ways in Greek territory through which this transportation can be effected, the Serbian

Government insists on the above mentioned road simply for the sake of avoiding the sinking of any of its transports. The losses sustained by Serbia during this war are so great and so much out of proportion to her real forces, that the Serbian Government considers it has the right to find the means of avoiding at least unnecessary losses which are not connected with the operations.

This desire seems to it the better founded as the Hellenic Government, by permitting to the Serbian army this passage through its territory, would in no way help the military operations and, consequently, would not be suspected of departing from the neutral conduct which it has observed up to the present. It would simply perform an act of friendship and of benevolent neutrality towards Serbia, upon which the Serbian Government hopes to be able to count by reason of the very spirit of the Greco-Serbian treaty, independently of the interpretations which may be given to its various provisions.

Awaiting with confidence the decision of the Greek Government, the Serbian Government considers it to be its friendly duty to call its attention to the disagreeable consequences which might result to Greco-Serbian relations, from a possible accident which might happen to a transport of Serbian troops, in consequence of the refusal of the Greek Government to permit their passage by land.

No. 42

*Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris and London.*¹

(Telegram)

ATHENS, April 8/21, 1916.

The Minister of Serbia came to see me yesterday and handed to me a note² by which Serbia, appealing to Greece as an ally, begs her to consent to the transportation of the Serbian troops now at Corfu to Salonika, via Patras and the railway. The reason given is that any other means of transportation incurs the risk of the destruction of the ships carrying these troops by enemy submarines.

In my answer, I declared to the Minister that I had already replied to the representatives of the Entente that the transportation of the Serbian troops by land could not possibly be permitted by the Royal

¹ This telegram was communicated to the Royal Legations at Rome and Petrograd.

² See document No. 41.

Government and that, consequently, I could not enter into any new conversation on this subject.

I called to the Minister's attention that my declaration was categorical and could in no way be modified, but that I had no objection to having a study of an absolutely private nature made into the question but that it could in no case, however, have a political result or influence the declarations which we have already made. The Minister said that he would telegraph to this effect to his government.

I communicate the above to you for your exclusive guidance and beg you not to make any use of it in your conversations, unless the Minister for Foreign Affairs first brings up the question of this step of the Serbian representative.

SKOULODIS.

No. 43

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, April 14/27, 1916.

Continuing my telegram of the 8th instant,¹ I have the honor to inform you that on Tuesday the Ministers of France and England came and declared to me that their governments had instructed them to support the step taken by the Minister of Serbia on April 7, and to give me the assurance that in using our railway the Serbian troops would not stop at Athens or anywhere else, except to change trains.

I replied that these declarations were to no purpose, since the Royal Government persisted resolutely in its refusal, expressed from the very beginning, to permit any transportation of foreign troops by our railways.

As Monsieur Guillemin said in reply that he had learned from the Minister of Serbia that I was negotiating with him, I answered that that was a serious error. I told him what had passed between the Minister of Serbia and myself, according to the statement contained in my above mentioned telegram of the 8th instant, and I affirmed that, according to our opinion, the exchange of views between the respective officers could in no way modify our decision to oppose energetically the passage by land of the Serbian troops.

¹ See document No. 42.

I gave the same explanation to the Minister of Serbia, who came to see me after his colleagues of France and England, and to the Ministers of Russia and Italy, who came on Wednesday to make the same representation as the other [two ministers].

As the Ministers of the Entente, and particularly Monsieur Guillemin, do not seem to have well understood the very serious and absolutely legitimate reasons for our refusal, I consider it necessary to record them here, requesting you to explain to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the hope that, realizing the gravity of the situation, he will be good enough to use all his influence at Paris to persuade the French Government to renounce the plan of having the Serbian army pass through our territory.

Such a passage would constitute the most flagrant and the most serious violation of our sovereignty and neutrality, which the other belligerent group would consider as a hostile act on the part of Greece, because it would amount to a grip on the very heart of our country. It would fatally create an unbearable derangement of the transportation of persons and goods over the principal railway of the kingdom. It would result, notwithstanding all assurances to the contrary, by the very force of circumstances, in the establishment of encampments of foreign troops in proximity to our principal cities and up to the very suburbs of the capital, thereby causing inevitable friction with the local authorities, inconveniences for the revictualling of our own populations, and serious dangers to the preservation of order and public health. It would finally lead to constant interferences of foreigners in the administration of the public services and to numerous arbitrary acts and restrictions upon personal liberty, of which we are constant spectators and have had sad experience at Salonika and Corfu.

It is because public opinion has immediately perceived the real danger to which the independence of the country would be thus exposed, being threatened in its most vital activities, that it rose indignantly against the plan of the passage by land and is resolved to demand from the Royal Government to use all its power in order to prevent its realization. Public opinion although bearing hard the numerous violations which have already taken place, has submitted to them with a resignation which hardly concealed its emotion, whenever it was possible to excuse them on the ground of military necessity. But this time its patience is exhausted and its indignation, aroused to

the point of leading it to commit desperate acts, is justified because the Entente can not allege any necessity for the passage of the Serbians by land, since their transports navigate the Mediterranean in all directions from Alexandria to Salonika, from Salonika to Marseilles, from Marseilles to Corfu, without suffering much from the attacks of the enemy submarines. Therefore, it can not seriously be contended that there exists a greater danger to the transportation of the Serbians by sea, particularly since the canal of Corinth and the Straits of Euboea, the use of which we tolerate, allow the voyage to be limited to very small areas outside of our narrow seas. On the other hand, it can not be denied that the Serbians themselves were transported from Albania to Corfu, without any accident, notwithstanding the submarines and the mines in the Adriatic.

Under these circumstances, the civilized world will unanimously justify the legitimate resistance of the Royal Government, just as it would unanimously condemn as a monstrous abuse of power any attempt of the Entente Powers to ignore our refusal.

Please telegraph at once the result of your conversation.

SKOULLOUDIS.

No. 44

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, April 14/27, 1916.

I communicate to you the following telegram¹ which I have just sent to London, Petrograd and Rome, by which please be guided in your conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about this serious matter in a purely private character and in your own name. I am really of opinion that, in view of the obstinacy shown by the French Minister, who claims to interpret faithfully the instructions of his government, every official discussion is not only useless but may embitter the relations which, on our part, we continue to wish to be sincere and friendly.

SKOULLOUDIS.

See document No. 43.

PART SECOND

THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION IN MACEDONIA

No. 45

*Lieutenant General Baïras, Commander of the 6th Division, to
the General Staff of the Army, Athens.*

(Telegram)

SERRES, April 27/May 10, 1916.

A Bulgarian major, who met one of our officers, declared to him that by reason of an agreement entered into between Mackensen and our government, the Germano-Bulgarians were permitted to occupy any point situated [up to] two kilometers of the frontier which might be considered suitable from a strategical and tactical point of view, and that, relying on this authorization and in consequence of an order from the Commander-in-Chief, he had occupied the hills dominating Lehovo; that all the boundary line was at our disposal, except the occupied points, that the entrance of Bulgarian troops into Lehovo had been forbidden and that [he expected] a friendly settlement of the question.

BAÏRAS.

No. 46

*Lieutenant General Yannakitsas, Minister of War, to the IV Army
Corps, at Cavalla.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, April 28/May 11, 1916.

The agreement entered into between the Germans and the Bulgarians stipulates that in the section Ali Boutous — Seïmen-Kayassi we shall retire one to two kilometers from the boundary line, while the Germans and the Bulgarians may reach the boundary line without crossing it, in order that a neutral zone may be formed to our disadvantage, since the Germano-Bulgarians are defending themselves

against the English and the French established in our territory. Consequently, both the slight advances to the north of Vetrina as well as the advance made near Lehovo constitute a violation of our agreement. Inform the Bulgarian major of Lehovo that he is mistaken about the agreement. Explain to him what is really going on and tell him that the dispute will be settled by the governments. Add that, not doubting his good faith and in order to maintain friendly relations between the two states, you will not use force against him, and that he can stay where he is until the question now pending is settled by the government, but that you will prevent by force any new advance on his part or on the part of any other detachment. All this you will tell him as coming from you. The 3rd Army Corps should, in what concerns it, conform itself to the contents of the present order.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 47

*Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Naoum, Minister
of Greece at Sofia.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, April 29/May 12, 1916.

Bulgarian troops have occupied certain points in our territory to the north of Vetrina and the heights of Lehovo. A Bulgarian major explained to one of our officers of the boundary region that these occupations were made in accordance with the agreement entered into between Marshal Mackensen and the Royal Government, according to which the Bulgarians have acquired the right to occupy any point which might be useful for their operations in a zone of two kilometers on this side of the frontier. This is an evident mistake. What we have consented to is only that the Bulgarians should not be bound to respect the neutral zone of one kilometer on each side of the frontier which was established in fact in the beginning of our mobilization, and that in the sector of Ali Boutous—Seïmen-Kayassi we would withdraw our troops to a distance of one to two kilometers on this side of the frontier; the Germano-Bulgarians can, therefore, carry on operations there up to the frontier, but without crossing it. Consequently, the Bulgarian advance to Vetrina and Lehovo,

far from being in accordance with the agreement, is an evident violation of it. Our officer on the boundary line explained to the Bulgarian major his mistake and [told him] that he tolerated temporarily, pending a friendly settlement between the two governments, the occupations which have been wrongly effected, but that he would oppose by force any new advance.

Please explain the above to the Minister for Foreign Affairs begging him kindly to see that orders are given to the Bulgarian troops operating on the frontier to evacuate the points occupied in our territory and to respect strictly the agreement entered into, in order to avoid incidents the consequences of which might be very regrettable.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 48

Letter sent by Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, May 9/22, 1916.
(Received May 10/23, 1916.)

Mr. President of the Council:

In consequence of the aggressive measures recently undertaken by the troops of the Entente, Germany and her Allies are obliged to enter Greek territory in order to insure the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel. This is a purely defensive measure which is due exclusively to the movements of the military forces of the Entente, and which will be maintained within the limits dictated by purely military interests.

Proceeding from this point of view, the Imperial Government of Germany does not hesitate at all to give to the Royal Hellenic Government the following assurances:

- (1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected.
- (2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist.
- (3) Greek sovereignty will be respected.
- (4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions will be respected.
- (5) Any damage caused by the German troops during their stay in Greek territory will be indemnified.

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner towards the population of the country.

Please receive, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high consideration.

MIRBACH.

No. 49

Letter sent by Mr. G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria at Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, May 9/22, 1916.

(Received May 10/23, 1916.)

Mr. President of the Council:

Bulgaria and her Allies are obliged, on account of the aggressive movement of the troops of the Entente, to insure to themselves the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel and for that object to effect the advance of their troops in Greek territories. It is merely a purely defensive measure which has been rendered necessary by the actions of the Entente, and which will be strictly limited to the military necessities.

The Royal Government of Bulgaria begs furthermore to make to the Royal Government of Greece the following declarations:

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected.

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist.

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected.

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions will be respected.

(5) Any damage caused by the Bulgarian troops during their stay in Greek territory will be indemnified.

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner toward the population of the country.

Please receive, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high consideration.

G. PASSAROF.

No. 50

Letter of Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens.

ATHENS, May 10/23, 1916.

Mr. Minister:

I have received the communication under yesterday's date which Your Excellency honored me by transmitting in order to inform me that in consequence of the aggressive measures recently undertaken by the troops of the Entente, Germany and her Allies are obliged to enter Greek territory in order to insure the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel; this is a purely defensive measure which is due exclusively to the movements of the military forces of the Entente, and which will be maintained within the limits dictated by purely military interests; that proceeding from this point of view, the Imperial Government of Germany does not hesitate at all to give to the Royal Hellenic Government the following assurances:

- (1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected.
- (2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist.
- (3) Greek sovereignty will be respected.
- (4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions will be respected.
- (5) Any damage caused by the German troops during their stay in Greek territory will be indemnified.
- (6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner toward the population of the country.

I take note of all the assurances contained in this communication, and beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high consideration.

SKOULODIS.

No. 51

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria at Athens.

(Letter)

ATHENS, May 11/24, 1916.

Mr. Minister:

Acknowledging receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that I take note of all the declarations contained therein.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration.

SKOULODIS.

No. 52

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, May 13/26, 1916.

I have reasons which make me believe that we must count on the possibility of an approaching advance of the Germans and Bulgarians in the narrow passes of Roupel.

THEOTOKY.

No. 53

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Berlin, Vienna and Sofia.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, May, 14/27, 1916.

Yesterday afternoon German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our boundaries at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which resorted to force in order to hold its position. Other detachments, consisting of 25,000 men, coming down this morning from the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina, occupied the heights toward Demir-Hissar and the bridge over the Strouma. They also took possession of the wooden bridge of Demir-Hissar. The population of this region is panic-stricken and is preparing to emigrate *en masse*, for it still retains the sad memory of the Bulgarian persecutions of 1912 and 1913.

This irruption into Greek territory is contrary to the agreement entered into between the German and Bulgarian military authorities and our own, according to which their troops, having been released from the obligation of observing the neutral zone established since the mobilization, could advance up to the boundary line but not cross it. In face of the excitement caused by the above mentioned invasion, not only among the populations of the invaded regions but also on public opinion throughout Greece, the Royal Government is bound to protest in the strongest manner to the Imperial German Government and to the governments of its Allies, and to insist that

orders be given to evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territory invaded by the German and Bulgarian troops.

Please proceed without delay to a firm representation to the above import to the government to which you are accredited and acquaint me immediately with the result.

SKOULLOUDIS.

No. 54

Letter sent by Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, (1) to Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany, (2) to Mr. J. Szilassy, Minister of Austria-Hungary, (3) to G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria, City.

ATHENS, May 15/28, 1916.

Mr. Minister:

On the afternoon of the day before yesterday German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which was obliged to resort to force in order to hold its position. Other German and Bulgarian detachments, consisting of nearly 25,000 men, penetrated yesterday the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina and occupied the heights towards Demir-Hissar, as well as the bridges of Strouma and Demir-Hissar.

This sudden irruption of important forces into Greek territory not only constitutes a violation of neutrality, but is also contrary to the agreement entered into between our military authorities and those of the German and Bulgarian armies, according to which the troops of the Central Powers, having been released from the obligation of observing the neutral zone established since the mobilization, could advance up to the Greek boundary line but without crossing it.

In face of this violation of neutrality and the lively emotion caused by it, not only among the populations of the invaded regions but also on public opinion throughout Greece, I must address to Your Excellency the strongest protests of the Royal Government, begging you to transmit them to your government, and I must insist that the German and Bulgarian troops evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territories invaded by them.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my high consideration.

S. SKOULLOUDIS.

No. 55

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Bucharest, Petrograd and Constantinople, and the Consulate General at Berne.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, May 16/29, 1916.

I have the honor to inform you that on the afternoon of the 13th of this month, German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which was obliged to resort to force in order to hold its position. Other German and Bulgarian detachments, consisting of nearly 25,000 men, penetrated next day the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina and occupied the heights towards Demir-Hissar, as well as the bridges of Strouma and Demir-Hissar.

In face of this violation of Greek territory, the Royal Government addressed yesterday evening to the Governments of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria a strong protest and demanded that the German and Bulgarian armies evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territories invaded by them.

You may communicate the above in your next conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but without calling on him specially or giving him a copy.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 56

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, May 17/30, 1916.

A communiqué of the General Staff announces only today the advance of the German and Bulgarian troops to the narrow passes of Roupel as follows:

German and Bulgarian forces, in order to insure themselves against the sudden attacks which the troops of the Entente were intending to undertake, occupied the complex of the narrow passes of Roupel, near the Strouma. The weak Greek outpost withdrew before superior numbers. The sovereign rights of Greece have been respected.

THEOTOKY.

No. 57

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister of Greece at Rome, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

ROME, May 17/30, 1916.

I have seen some persons of importance since the telegrams from Greece and Sofia have announced that the Bulgarians with fifes and drums, have entered our territory occupying our outposts and villages, on the heels of our soldiers who withdrew without resistance. The impression which it made here is deplorable. For they recall our recent declaration that we would never allow our hereditary enemy, — from whom we can expect nothing but misfortunes and ruin, — to cross our frontier and to tread as conqueror the soil of Greece. Many persons ask what our assurances are worth; and the Italians are ready to believe that, as in Macedonia, so also in Epirus, we shall retreat before the Bulgarians, with or without the Austrians, and that it is better that no account whatever be taken of us, of our deceitful promises, and of our imaginary guarantees. Bulgaria, having at the head a German Marshal, who is her own king, invaded Greece under auspices such as she could never have dreamed of; she will never depart from there, unless we have the force to throw her out of our territory, and this force they do not see either in our will or in our army. If she is defeated, she will be defeated by others than us; if victorious, she will again and firmly erect her flag on the very spots which she has drenched with Greek blood in her old massacres, and very delusive is the hope that she will be dislodged in favor of those who have not fought.

COROMILAS.

No. 58

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, May 19/June 1, 1916.

The impressions of the French Government on the invasion of Greek Macedonia were communicated to me by the Director of Political Affairs in a long conversation with him, which is as follows:

Mr. Margerie told me that public opinion was under the impression that the events which have taken place during these last days are the result of an agreement between Greece and the Central Powers. Furthermore, information from German sources proclaims it. As for the French Government, it was disposed to accept the explanation that considerations of defense had led the Bulgarians to occupy strategical positions such as the narrow passes which the fortress of Roupel commands, but the advance of the Bulgarian army into the interior of Greek Macedonia, the occupation by it of the environs of cities coveted by Bulgaria, the possible march of the Bulgarians on Cavalla, must necessarily lead it to draw the natural conclusion that Greece must have received assurances guaranteeing the restitution of these regions, of the value of which assurances she ought not to have the slightest illusion.

In any case, the situation has just changed radically by reason of the Bulgarian advance. In fact, Greece, by her passive attitude in the face of an invasion which might weaken the military situation of the Allies, appears to be abandoning her policy of benevolent neutrality, and, consequently, the Entente can not but resume the necessary freedom in order to insure the preponderance of its armies acting in the Balkans. This freedom has reference as much to military operations as to measures of internal police, and General Sarraill has to that effect received orders giving him an extent of action larger than heretofore.

In my conversation with Mr. Margerie, I did not fail to make use of the information transmitted to me by your telegram.¹

CACLAMANOS.

No. 59

Mr. D. Panas, Minister of Greece at Petrograd, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PETROGRAD, May 21/June 3, 1916.

The Director of Political Affairs, speaking to me on the situation in Greece, told me today that in France and in England there is much irritation against us and that in official circles here there is the impres-

¹ See document No. 55.

sion, if not the conviction, that the occupation of Roupel and the advance of the Bulgarians in Macedonia, to which Greece has consented, prove the existence of a preliminary agreement with Bulgaria. They combine with these facts, upon which they comment very fully, the interview of General Dousmanis, published in April by a Swedish newspaper, a telegraphic summary of which, by a surprising coincidence, was only transmitted here yesterday. I hastened to explain to the Director that there was no truth in all this, and that one could not base a judgment as to the policy of a government on mere suppositions and attribute to it a design which it never had. As the words of the General have probably been distorted by the newspaper, I think it would be proper to make, as soon as possible, a categorical denial of the declarations attributed [to him].

I understand that the withdrawal of the guarantees which were given to us at the time of the temporary occupation of our territories is now the subject of an exchange of views between the Entente Powers and we may expect coercive measures.

I must add that the Director is in constant touch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and reflects in his conversations the views of his chief.

PANAS.

No. 60

MINUTES OF THE BOULÉ OF THE HELLENES

53d Session, May 23/June 5, 1916.

(Extract)

The sitting having been resumed, Mr. S. Skouloudis, the President of the Government, addressing the Boulé, made the following communication:

"Since the suspension of the labors of the Boulé, serious events have taken place in our country which may be thus narrated:

"On the 13th of May at 12 o'clock noon, the Ministry of War received from the commander of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, a telegram according to which the 6th Division reported to the 4th Army Corps at 11:45 A.M. that a column of Germans and Bulgarians had informed our battalion near Roupel that it would enter our territory. The 4th Army Corps added, that in accordance with the previous orders of the Ministry, the 6th Division ordered our detachments at Roupel to resist by force the advance of the Germans and Bul-

garians. The same hour, at 12 noon, the Ministry of War received a telegram from the 3d Army Corps stating that the outposts of the company of Vetrina (in the narrow pass of Roupel on the other shore of the Strouma) reported that a detachment of the German army, led by German officers, had surrounded our outposts and declared that it would enter our territory in order to occupy important positions. In answer to the reply of our men that they had orders to resist, the commanding German officer declared that he would occupy the heights at any cost, and at the same time other German detachments were crossing the boundaries with convoys. At 1:20 P.M. another telegram was received from the 4th Army Corps according to which two Bulgarian or German regiments had taken up their positions opposite Hodjogo (to the north of Roupel) and German troops had entered our territory in the sector of Topolnitsa, but from a telegram of the commander of the Roupel fortress which did not reach here until 11 at night, it appeared that the German and Bulgarian forces who crossed our frontier had commenced to appear at 9:45 A.M. At 5:40 P.M. of the same day, on the 13th of May, the Ministry of War received a telegram from the commander of the fortress of Salonika, according to which the Germans and Bulgarians, throwing the responsibility for what might happen on the Greek army, had crossed the boundary line at 2:30 P.M. and proceeded to the slopes of the fortress Roupel. The fortress fired twenty-four artillery shots at them. At the same time a telegram was received from the 4th Army Corps, according to which the covering infantry had also commenced to fire against the invaders, who came to a stop.

At 1:00 o'clock in the morning of the 13th to the 14th a telegram was received from the 6th Division, according to which the commander of the Germano-Bulgarian troops opposite Roupel declared to the commander of the fortress that it must be evacuated during the night because it would at all events be occupied by them. Under these circumstances, the government, seeing on the one hand the determination of the invaders to occupy the fortress, and, on the other hand, that the continuation of armed resistance which might at any moment be transformed into a general clash would lead to the abandonment of the policy of neutrality — which it does not intend to abandon, — ordered, through the Ministry of War, first, the cessation of resistance, and later that a declaration should be made to the German commander that in the face of a general invasion of the German army in the narrow

pass of Demir-Hissar, inside of which the fortress is located, the garrison of the fortress was obliged to withdraw, carrying with it all the war material in the fortress. Since the evening of May 13th our military authorities had lodged protests against the Germans and Bulgarians. On May 15th, at 2:00 P.M. the Ministry of War received a telegram from the commander of the fortress of Salonika, bearing date of the previous day, according to which on May 14th, at 9:45 A.M., namely, twenty-four hours after the first appearance of the invaders, our commander had departed from Roupel; that the garrison had taken with it the heavy guns and all the field guns, except two from which they had removed and carried away the breechblocks, a considerable quantity of rifle cartridges, all the sanitary material, and the gun sights, regulators, the tools of the engineering [corps], the dynamite, the gun-powder and the quick firing guns. A German officer by the name of Thiel occupied the fortress and drew up a protocol for the remaining material and the two field guns, which are to be restored. A more recent telegram from the 6th Division, dated May 15, reported that the war material of the Roupel fortress had been transported to Serres.

On May 14 the government hastened to protest, in the strongest manner, to the Governments of Germany and her Allies against these occurrences. The same day that this protest had been sent, a telegram was received from the Minister of Greece at Berlin, dated the previous day at 8:00 P.M., namely, the 13th day of May, in which the Minister informed the government that "he had reasons to believe that we should have in view the probability of an impending advance of the Germans and Bulgarians in the narrow passes of Roupel."¹ From this telegram it is seen that the fact of the invasion, which commenced on the morning of May 13th, had not been communicated to the minister at Berlin up to the evening of the same day.

On May 17th, the following official communiqué of the German General Staff was published in Berlin:

German and Bulgarian forces, in order to insure themselves against sudden attacks from the Entente troops, occupied the complex of narrow passes of Roupel, near the Strouma. The weak Greek garrisons withdrew before superior numbers. The sovereign rights of Greece have been respected.²

The documents exchanged between our officers and the invaders, the protests and protocols, as well as the detailed reports of our

¹ See document No. 52.

² See document No. 56.

officers, have not yet been received on account of the interruption of safe communications, which interruption also made telegraphic communication difficult during those days.

It was in this way that the occupation of the narrow passes of Roupel took place. This report proves the groundless nature of the rumors, which were intentionally circulated in order to slander Greece, as having acted perfidiously towards the interests of the Entente and partially toward its adversaries. In view of such reports, I must declare and affirm in the most categorical manner that what happened was not due to an understanding with the Greek Government and that the Greek Government did not acquiesce in nor tolerate it, the proof of which is that the fortress of Roupel fired against the invaders.¹

The reports maliciously circulated that the General Staff or any other branch of the government, had, as was alleged, come to a previous understanding with the Germans and Bulgarians to the end that Roupel should be surrendered to them, are unworthy of denial or even of any answer. Neither the General Staff, nor any other branch of the government, acts without proper direction, but all act under the orders and responsibility of the government. (Applause.)

On the other hand, I ought not to omit to say that the character of the action of the Germans and Bulgarians who invaded Greek territory, according to the declarations which were made as to this, permits the government to give the assurance that it is an act which has been done with an absolutely military object in view and which does not in the least endanger the integrity or interests of the country. (Applause.)

No. 61

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, May 24/June 6, 1916.

From the time of the occupation of Roupel by the Germano-Bulgarian detachments, although the surrender of this fortress was a necessity imposed by the policy of neutrality followed by Greece, —

¹ See documents Nos. 48, 49, 50 and 51.

a policy which in no way implied armed resistance when, as was the case here, detachments belonging to the Powers hostile to the Entente decided to occupy the positions which seemed to them to be necessary, — the most malicious reports have begun to be circulated in regard to our attitude in this matter. The opponents of the government and foreigners who are interested in seeing the relations between Greece and the Entente Powers embittered have not hesitated to affirm that the surrender of Roupel fortress was agreed upon beforehand between the Royal Government and the enemies of the Entente, in order to injure from a military point of view the security of the army of General Sarraïl or the success of his future operations.

For that reason I have deemed it necessary to refute these slanders by the declarations which I made yesterday in the Chamber, and of which a summary in extenso was transmitted by telegraphic agencies.¹

Please take advantage of your first conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to repeat to him the official assurance, that it is absolutely false that the Germano-Bulgarian troops occupied Roupel in consequence of any agreement whatever; that on the contrary, the garrison in the beginning resisted by force the advance of the detachments in question, and that it was only in consequence of the declaration made by their chief to the commander of our fortress that if he did not withdraw during the night, Roupel would be occupied by force, that the government, in order to avoid an armed conflict which would have resulted in the abandonment of neutrality by Greece, gave the order for the evacuation of the position. You will add that the governments of the Entente should not allow themselves to be deceived by these slanderous maneuvers, against which both my predecessors and myself have been obliged to contend. Thus, under the Zaïmis Ministry, the Royal Legations at Bucharest and at London had advised us that in diplomatic and press circles the report was persistently circulated that an agreement had been made between Greece and Bulgaria about the cession of Ghevgheli and Doiran, and on other questions. Mr. Zaïmis had hastened to deny these reports and to denounce these maneuvers which were intended to compromise Greece in the eyes of the Entente. Several times the Bulgarian and Austrian newspapers have published similar news, trying to compromise the members of the Royal Government or the Greek representatives abroad, by publishing so-called interviews which were said to have

¹ See these declarations in No. 60.

been given by these persons to their correspondents, but which were a tissue of lies. The Allied Governments were finally on each occasion convinced of the falseness of these rumors, which were certainly inspired by malice. I hope that this time also the same results will follow the declarations made by the Royal Government before the Chamber, which you are herewith instructed on its behalf to communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SKOULLOUDIS.

No. 62

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, May 24/June 6, 1916.

I have just had a long conversation with Mr. Briand, to whom I handed a note formulating the protest which was contained in your telegram and stating our point of view as to the interpretation given by us to our benevolent neutrality towards the Entente. I have also verbally explained to the President of the Council that a neutrality, no matter how benevolent it may be towards anyone, can not involve military [action] against the adversaries of the latter, because it would cease then to be neutrality. The President of the Council, after having carefully read the note which was handed to him, entered into a discussion which may be summed up as follows:

The proclamation of martial law in Salonika was the result of the decision [of Greece] not to oppose the invasion of her territory by the Bulgarian army, for it is only the Bulgarian army that is in Greece, the Germans not having available forces for that purpose. In taking this step, General Sarrail informed General Moschopoulos that the holiday of His Majesty the King could be celebrated as usual, and it was the latter who revoked the order for the celebration. As for the want of previous notification to the Royal Government, the latter had often been advised of this before, and in any case, the communication of Mr. Guillemin took the place of such notice.

Mr. Briand repeated to me that the attitude of Greece surprised him the more inasmuch as the Royal Government had often declared that it had received assurances that the Bulgarians [would not invade] Greece. He took special note of our express denial that there had

been a previous agreement between Greece and the Great Central Powers for the occupation of the fortress of Roupel. He added that, if the Bulgarians advance, General Sarraïl "would take all the further measures which would seem to him to be proper in order to guarantee the security of the troops under his command." The President of the Council could not tell me what these measures would be, but said that in no case could the Allied troops be exposed to danger [words illegible] by reason of the passive attitude of Greece. According to Mr. Briand [words illegible], the aim of the Bulgarians was only too evident. Holding Serbian Macedonia, they wished also to hold [words illegible] in Eastern Macedonia in order to arrange "combinations" in the future. He assured me that for some time past, they had attempted through various agents to lure the Powers of the Entente into negotiations. Holding the keys of the gates which lead to Serres, Drama and Cavalla, they [the Bulgarians] may get there whenever they consider the moment favorable. If they do not advance now, it is because their flank would be exposed to the attacks of the Allies.

CACLAMANOS.

No. 63

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, May 24/June 6, 1916.

The serious phase into which our relations with the Entente have entered, imposes upon me the duty to summarize as briefly as possible the situation as it is here regarded, and as developed from my official and other conversations, as well as to [transmit to you] the articles published in all the newspapers during these days, in order that Your Excellency may have all the elements necessary for the understanding of the sentiments of official circles and public opinion in France.

First of all, one should note that the attitude of Mr. Briand is dictated by considerations both of an external and of an internal character. In fact, since the invasion of Greek territory by the Germano-Bulgarian forces without any effective resistance on our part and the consequent conviction which has been formed here that an agreement exists between Greece and the Central Powers, the President of the

Council seems to be haunted by the memory of previous discomfitures at the hand of the Bulgarians, and to believe that he may be exposed to similar disappointments from us. In order, therefore, to defend himself against any subsequent charge of having shown too much benevolence towards Greece, he is beginning to take the initiative in rigorous measures to which I fear the proclamation of martial law in Salonika is only the prelude. The phrase uttered by a journalist, "if Ernest Renan were watching over the Acropolis, all that would not have happened," is sufficiently characteristic, and official organs do not cease to expatiate on the subject that only the Germans know how to show themselves strong, and that the Orientals are only impressed [by] force.

As to the belief that the occupation of the Roupel fortress was agreed upon between Greece and the enemies of the Entente this was not accredited to the telegrams of the "Exchange" agency, which you instructed me to deny simultaneously with the denials transmitted directly from Athens through the agencies and published in the French press, but to information which appeared in the *Neueste Nachrichten* of Munich which alleged that an agreement between Greece and Bulgaria existed not only on the question of the invasion of Greek territory, but also on the other disputed questions between the two countries. To this information Mr. Margerie also alluded during our conversation the other day,¹ and the officious *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* has just published news which is considered here as a confirmation of it.

I will add that the French Government, although all but certain that Greece could not have opposed by force the invasion of her territory by the Bulgarians, really hoped, as I positively know, that she would have prevented the invasion through diplomatic means because of the excitement which such action would cause in Greece. Disappointed in this hope, he was forced to conclude that Greece was bound to the Central Powers by such important and definite agreements that even the occupation by the Bulgarian army of the Macedonian regions coveted by Bulgaria could not disturb her. We should not overlook that the excitement of a portion of the Italian press is not without effect. Thus, its charge that the new loan furnished by the National Bank was only made possible through the assistance of German-American financiers, is beginning to receive wide publication here and naturally it does not fail to excite French public opinion still more.

¹ See document No. 58.

No. 64

Mr. J. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria in Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, May 27/June 9, 1916.

Mr. President of the Council:

In reply to Your Excellency's letter dated May 15th last, concerning the occupation by the German and Bulgarian troops of the fortress of Roupel, the heights and the bridge of Demir-Hissar, as well as of the bridge on the Strouma, the Royal Legation of Bulgaria, in the name of its government, has the honor to bring to the knowledge of the Hellenic Government that these military operations have been imposed as a measure of security and legitimate defense resulting from the considerable advance of the troops of the Entente on Greek territory in the section opposite the above mentioned places, an advance which will evidently be followed by an attack.

The Royal Government of Bulgaria declares that imminent danger has compelled it to act thus in the circumstances, and that the measure which was adopted will in no way impair the sovereign rights of Greece.

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high consideration.

PASSAROF.

No. 65

Memorandum of the General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, June 7/20, 1916.

The official documents of the Bulgarian Government which have come into the possession of the Ministry concerning the surrender of the Roupel fortress make no mention of restitution. They are limited to the declaration that this occupation will not impair the sovereign rights of Greece. But, as the President informed me that he is in possession of documents pledging the restitution of the fortress by Germany and by Bulgaria, I begged him a few days ago to place these documents in the official files of the Ministry. The President answered me that he would do so in due time. Today I reminded him again of the necessity of such filing, as well as the recording of the protocol of the surrender of the fortress Roupel, a protocol which has not yet been received in the office. The President again repeated the promise that he would file these documents.

No. 66

*Letter of Mr. S. Skouloudis to Mr. N. Politis, General Director
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

ATHENS, June 8/21, 1916.

Dear Mr. Politis:

I am sending you, herewith attached, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two documents dated May 9/22 ultimo, the one from the German, the other from the Bulgarian, Legations here, and my answer to them.¹ As you will notice, the said Legations in presenting these documents characterized them as secret; but afterwards, at my request, the Minister of Germany informed me, by order of his government, that the characterization of secrecy was withdrawn and that we could make use of the said documents whenever we wished.

With high esteem,

S. SKOULOUDIS.

No. 67

*Extract from the Confidential Record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for the year 1916.*

Number of order	Entered		Date of recording	Forwarding authority	Summary of docu- ment entered
	Date	Number			
7242	August 9	7147	9 August	German Legation	That the Germano-Bulgarian troops will not enter in the cities of Drama, Serres and Cavalla. ²

¹ See documents Nos. 48, 49, 50 and 51.

² This document was not found in the archives of the Ministry.

No. 68

*Letter sent by Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens,
to Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

ATHENS, August 15/28, 1916.

Mr. President of the Council:

Referring to the communication which Mr. Caradja was pleased to make to me in your name last Tuesday, I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the situation in the district of Cavalla has since been modified by the fact that the Greek troops voluntarily surrendered to the Bulgarians the forts and batteries in question. An inventory of the material found there on that occasion was made by both parties.

The Bulgarians have been stationed around the city but outside of its suburbs. General Jekoff has proceeded to take the necessary steps to insure the revictualling of the population as well as the Greek troops.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high esteem and devoted and sincere sentiments.

MIRBACH.

No. 69

*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Troupakis, Commander of the Gendarmerie
in Macedonia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bureau of
Political Affairs), Athens.*

SALONIKA, August 28/September 10, 1916.

I have the honor to report that, after the invasion of the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and its occupation by them, both postal and telegraphic communication were interrupted, and consequently my office has not been able since the 5th ultimo to communicate with the police precincts of Serres and Drama, which are under my office, and is ignorant of what has happened and is happening in the jurisdiction of said precincts to the injury of the inhabitants and that of the military and other authorities.

Only yesterday the police volunteers of the second class, namely, Joannes Tsikrikontis, Apostolos Chrysafides, and Apostolos Boyadjis, of the police precinct of Drama, having arrived here via Cavalla and Thasos, appeared before me and reported that the Bulgarians are

committing outrages against the Greek authorities, omitting no opportunity to show their hostile disposition and criminal instincts, and that, briefly stated, the Bulgarians have committed the following acts:

(1) On the night of the 6th to the 7th ultimo, the Turkish inhabitants of the district of Doxato, encouraged by the Bulgarian troops who had invaded that district, and infuriated against everything Greek, rebelled and attacked the Greek inhabitants and the men of the flying column under the command of Adjutant Constantine Limberi. An encounter followed which caused the death of two Turks and the capture of twenty-eight, of whom, however, thirteen were freed by force from the prisons by the Bulgarian soldiers of Doxato. Sergeant Panayotis Demetracopoulo of the flying column was slightly wounded in the left foot.

(2) On the night of the 8th to the 9th of the same month, seven gendarmes of Sarnitz Post and Sergeant Tryphon Yannari, the chief of the post, and an equal number of men from the Yenikioi post including Sergeant Stamatios Chrysafides their chief of post, were killed by the rebel Turks and the Bulgarian *comitadjis*.

(3) At Oxilar, four gendarmes whose names are not known were killed, together with eleven soldiers and a sergeant with their lieutenant.

(4) On the 10th ultimo, the gendarme Demetrios Papas with his comrade Athanasios Amaxopoios of the police sub-precinct of Sarisaban, while accompanying the public treasurer of Keramiti, were attacked by Bulgarian soldiers, and in this attack Papas was killed and Amaxopoios severely wounded in the shoulder-blade, as I reported also in my letter of the 12th ultimo.

(5) The gendarmes of the flying column of Prosotsani and the commander of the flying column, Adjutant Constantine Gali, were disarmed and insulted by Bulgarian soldiers; having been re-armed by the police precinct of Drama, they were again disarmed and, after being beaten, were ordered to return to Drama.

(6) The Turks of the district of Moustratli, immediately after the invasion of the Bulgarians, armed themselves and attacked the men of the police post, whom they would have killed had these not succeeded in escaping. The Turks entered Doxato and proceeded to plunder and exterminate the Greek inhabitants, and this provoked an encounter with the gendarmerie, as is mentioned in the first paragraph of the present report.

(7) The refugee inhabitants of Yenikioi and Dariovi, in order to escape the fury of the Bulgarians, fled to Cavalla, but on their way they were robbed by the Turkish rebels.

(8) The gendarmes of all the sub-precincts and posts of the police precinct of Drama were disarmed and those who were not killed were beaten and sent to Drama in wretched condition.

(9) Three gendarmes of the police sub-precinct of Pravi, while escorting to Cavalla two Turks accused of robbery, were attacked on their way by Bulgarian soldiers. Their fate is unknown.

(10) The Bulgarians sent word from Drama to Cavalla, where there was a dearth of provisions, that fifty carts should be sent to them, in order to receive these provisions, which were sent in the custody of three gendarmes and three soldiers. The Bulgarians cut off the fingers of both hands of one of the soldiers, and disarmed the gendarmes and sent them to Cavalla.

(11) The chief, Comitadji Panitsa, at the head of *comitadjis*, goes about freely in the District of Drama, robbing, killing, etc.

(12) All the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants of Eastern Macedonia, assisted by the Bulgarian army, are killing the Greek inhabitants, and plundering and destroying their properties; the latter, in face of the danger which hangs over them, flee panic-stricken to Cavalla and from there to Thasos, leaving everything at the mercy of the murderers and persecutors, the Greek authorities not being in a position to afford them the slightest help. Thus Eastern Greek Macedonia is at the absolute disposal of the hereditary enemies of the nation.

TROUPAKIS.

No. 70

*Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia; to Mr. E.
Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

(Telegram)

SOFIA, December 5/18, 1916.

I am informed by a subordinate official of ours who came from Serres, that many prominent men have been either imprisoned or expelled from there, and that Bulgarian night-patrols have entered into houses and plundered them. The population is suffering from the terribly high prices and the harshness of the Bulgarians, and there is not a single German officer to supervise the Bulgarian administration. The

roofs of the military barracks and of the School of Agriculture have been removed in order to furnish timber for the construction of trenches. It is said that after the deportation of the population of the district of Bairacli-Djoumaya because of military necessity, Bulgarian soldiers, according to the orders they had received, plundered houses and carried to an unknown place the spoils of their plundering. The above mentioned city was completely destroyed by the bombardment and the population was transferred to Pozarevitch. I am informed from Drama that the Greek authority exists only in form. Taneff, the military governor, dismissed the Greek mayor of Cavalla, with all the municipal council, and replaced him by a Turk. Lastly, the mayors of the villages were dismissed and Bulgarians and Turks were appointed in their places. In some villages the churches and schools were taken possession of, and the teaching of the Bulgarian language has been begun. Many plunderings and violent requisitions without payment have taken place and it is said that the village of Nea Midia was completely destroyed and the inhabitants murdered. Many of our compatriots from Drama and Cavalla [words illegible] are detained as prisoners. The native Turks in the beginning plundered many villages and killed a good many of the Christian inhabitants. It seems that now some kind of order has begun to be established, but on account of the high prices of the provisions and the insufficiency of bread the population of the occupied places is suffering much. Plunderings have not taken place in Drama, but in Cavalla all the houses have been forcibly entered into, and the movable property will soon be transported to Sofia by special trains. The refugees of the district of Serres were taken by force to Drama, where they suffer intensely from hunger, and [words illegible] deaths from hunger were noted. The above mentioned refugees will be transported to Serbia for residence there. I have taken the indicated steps with the Prime Minister concerning the above situation, and have telegraphed to the Royal Legation in Berlin in order that proper action may be taken.

NAOUM.

No. 71

*Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N.
Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, December 13/26, 1916.

From the telegram of our minister at Sofia dated the 5th instant ¹ you are informed about the horrible situation in which the inhabitants of our provinces occupied by the Bulgarians are found. Plunderings, thefts, destruction and even murders are the order of the day. Our people, reduced to misery and starvation, are decimated. The Greek churches and schools have been taken possession of by the Bulgarians, while the prominent men of our cities and villages have been thrown into prison.

We earnestly beg the German Government to take the most serious steps in order to put a stop to this deplorable state of affairs; particularly to take away from the Bulgarians the administration of the country and to entrust it to German officials.

You should tell the German Government that it is inconceivable that, after having occupied or left to be occupied Eastern Macedonia, which is, indirectly, it is true, the cause of all the misfortunes from which Greece now suffers, after not keeping the express promises given in writing not to occupy the three large Macedonian cities and to respect individual liberty, private property and the religious *status quo*, it now leaves the Bulgarians free to exterminate the Hellenic element in Macedonia.

You should add that we have the right to expect from the Imperial Government radical steps for the security of our nationals in Eastern Macedonia, and of their properties, as well as of those belonging to the State.

Please take immediately the above mentioned step and communicate the result to me. Be guided by the present telegram without leaving a copy of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

¹ See document No. 70.

No. 72

*Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E.
Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

(Telegram)

SOFIA, January 1/14, 1917.

In continuation of my telegram of December 5th,¹ I have the honor to inform you that General Taneff, the military Governor of the occupied territories in Eastern Macedonia, has just arrived in Sofia. In the course of the visit which he paid me today, I explained to him at length the sad situation of our nationals, as I had already done in a note presented to the Bulgarian Government. General Taneff attributed some of the excesses which have been committed to the bad conduct of the Turks towards our people, and some to the disorder resulting from the entrance of foreign troops into our territory, but he nevertheless admitted that most of my remarks were well founded and promised to take all the necessary measures for the amelioration of the situation.

I shall not fail to follow as closely as possible, all that concerns our nationals in occupied Eastern Macedonia, and to make, from time to time, the necessary representations.

NAOUM.

No. 73

*Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A.
Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia.*

(Telegram)

ATHENS, January 5/18, 1917.

I thank you for the information contained in your telegram of the 1st instant.² Please follow closely this very serious question and report to me from time to time.

ZALOCOSTAS.

¹ See document No. 70.

² See document No. 72.

No. 74

*Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zolocostas,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

(Telegram)

SOFIA, February 15/28, 1917.

The Prefect of Drama telegraphs that economic distress having arisen among the laboring classes on account of the anomalous situation created in his district and the want of work, [illegible words] many deaths are noted from starvation in Cavalla and in other parts of the province. In order to remedy this situation, I proceeded to establish in the principal places of the Province economical bakeries in order to distribute gratuitously bread at least to the hungry people; but, since in the district of Drama, apart from the families without work, there have flocked thither thousands of refugees from those that had been installed by the Greek Government in the district of Serres, who were forced by the Bulgarians, for military reasons, to leave that region, the maintenance of these economical bakeries by private initiative alone becomes impossible on account of the steady rise of prices of provisions. The Prefect, therefore, begs that the Royal Government approve a credit of at least 200,000 drachmas for their maintenance, in order to avert numerous deaths from starvation, particularly among those families to many of whom an allowance was being given by the Commission for the Establishment of Refugees.¹

NAOUM.

No. 75

*Report of a high public official of Eastern Macedonia dated March 9, 1917,
transmitted from Germany through the Royal Legation at Berlin, to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

I have the honor to report the following facts which, during my forced residence in Cavalla, I personally witnessed or heard reported by reliable persons occupying high social positions.

¹ This telegram was transmitted on February 25 to the Ministry of the Interior, which returned it on March 1st with a note that the question should be submitted to the Ministerial Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote on the returned document: "[Action deferred] until more favorable financial conditions. For the present to be filed."

On Tuesday, August 30 (O. S.), 1916, the day following the departure of the Greek troops which were in Cavalla for Drama and Germany, a company of the Bulgarian Army stationed along the line of the fortresses of Cavalla entered the city. Immediately upon their entrance, the Commander of the company, assuming at once the duties of military governor of the city, placed sentinels at the doors of the public buildings and particularly at those of the military depots of war material; likewise, the inhabitants who had gathered on the shore intending to leave Cavalla were ordered to return to their homes, and to bring back with them, at the same time, their furniture and other things which were piled up on the shore for shipping, the departure from the city of any person and all communication with the shore being strictly forbidden. The Greek flag which was waving on the fortress was hauled down and torn to shreds by the Turkish populace, which, immediately after the entrance of the Bulgarians, had to a man renounced the Hellenic State and from motives of self-interest had received the Bulgarians as the Allies of the Ottomans in the present pan-European War. All the inhabitants, through a public crier, were most strictly ordered to remain in their homes from sunset to next morning with all lights extinguished. These matters being thus arranged, there began, without delay, the systematic emptying of the public stores of war material and its transportation by night outside the city by the Bulgarian officers of the Commissary Department who had come there for this purpose.

Likewise, the Bulgarian Military Governor of the city having appointed Hamdi Bey, a Turk, to the vacant place of Mayor (he at once formed a Municipal Council composed of Turks, the Greek members of the Council having been, for some time, treacherously imprisoned with this very object in view, as being suspects), there began an implacable robbery of the properties of the Greeks by the Bulgarians and Turks through false requisitions of the goods in their stores, through extortions of money, through arbitrary plundering from the houses and shops of all material which was useful or salable, and through a skillful and shameful increase in the price of provisions and articles of first necessity.

Although nobody's life was at that time threatened, the Bulgarian terrorism of the first months purposely held the fear of death steadily over the heads of the Greek inhabitants of the city. Nevertheless, order was always preserved in Cavalla by Bulgarian patrols, and except for a few murders which were committed at night for purposes of

robbery, and which were attributed to Bulgarian and Turkish soldiers (the Turkish inhabitants in spite of their claim to Hellenic citizenship being impressed into the army by the Bulgarians and forming a separate Turkish corps), full security prevailed. There existed, however, a great distrust, during the first months, on the part of the Bulgarians toward the Greeks, (particularly the Greek military men) whom they considered as Venizelists, or at all events as suspects. As soon as such persons were discovered by the Bulgarians, they were imprisoned for many days and after various privations and humiliations were taken out of Cavalla to Drama or Sofia (such was the fate of Eustathios Pharaclas, a retired colonel of the Commissary Department and bookkeeper of the storehouse of material for fortifications in Cavalla and of J. Botagas, Second Lieutenant of the Infantry Reserve, etc.). Likewise, the Greek officials of posts and telegraphs of Cavalla were removed from there as suspects and sent to Drama, where they still remain.

Since there were no Greek authorities in Cavalla, the interests of the city were intrusted to Hamdi Bey, the Turkish Mayor, who, with his Municipal Council, which was composed exclusively of Turks, played great havoc not only with the public property of the city but also with the private property of its Greek inhabitants. On account of the Turks' lust for robbery and the complete indifference of the Bulgarian military authorities in the city to the horrible consequences of their acts, there was created a scarcity of bread, provisions, and things of prime necessity, unprecedented and unheard of even in the annals of cities long besieged. This caused a great moral and material upheaval and a terrible famine, with deaths, from starvation, of 10 to 15 persons a day, on an average. All these things took place with the toleration and utter indifference of the military authorities of the city, who busied themselves only with the emptying of the public warehouses and the big commerical shops of the city which had been abandoned by their owners. This was followed by a downright looting of private houses in broad daylight under the pretext of a search for government military supplies, which had not been turned over to them by the inhabitants, as they had been repeatedly called on by the public crier to do.

As a consequence of the complete indifference of the Bulgarians, nay, of their coöperation (for they had imported from Bulgaria various articles of first necessity in order to resell them for a sordid

gain), the cruel and wild cupidity which was carried on by the Turks and Hebrews of the city has raged and is raging still, till it has raised the prices per okka as follows:

The price of bread (a miserable mixture of wheat, in imperceptible quantities, of maize, of rye, of barley and of various impure substances) went up to 8-10 lebs (leb, a Bulgarian drachma, forced by the Bulgarians into circulation in the market of Cavalla and arbitrarily made equivalent to the Hellenic drachma), the price of meat and of dried beans to 8-12 lebs, that of cheese to 24-36 lebs, of butter or fat to 40-50 lebs, of salt to 12-30 lebs, of sugar to 60-80 lebs, of rice to 24 lebs, of vegetables to 4 lebs, of potatoes to 6-8 lebs, of wine to 8 lebs, of milk, always unscrupulously adulterated, to 4 lebs, of barley to 10 lebs, of eggs to 60-80 centimes each, of leeks to 1 leb the bunch (three leeks to a bunch), of charcoal to $1\frac{1}{2}$ lebs an okka, etc., etc.

After the Bulgarians had emptied the public warehouses, they proceeded, under the pretext of commandeering, arbitrarily to empty all the large shops (that of Mr. Rakidji, e.g.), the groceries (that of Mr. Sertsos, e.g.), the hardware stores, whose owners were absent through fear, having left Cavalla a little before the Bulgarian occupation of that city and also to search all the private houses, most systematically. This was carried out by Bulgarian officers and sub-lieutenants, at the head of a squad or platoon by order of the Bulgarian city authorities. On this occasion, in addition to the small number of things for military use, which were thus found (rifles, revolvers, blankets, canteens, etc.), the Bulgarian officers seized and carried away, without giving any receipt whatever, all the uniforms, howsoever found by them, of the Greek officers of the garrison of Cavalla, who, on departing hastily on the 28-29th of August 1916 (O. S.) had left them to be cared for in the houses or hotels where they resided, as well as all other articles of military character and the furniture and other valuable things belonging to them and to their families, such as e.g. the property of Lieutenant General Ghennadis, the Commander of the IVth Army Corps (in the upper part of the house where the officers of the Army Corps were) that of Division Commander Colonel I. Hatzopoulos (in the house of the former Mayor of Cavalla, Mr. N. Serdaroglou), that of J. Costaki, Major of Artillery, and of Majors G. Kortsas, C. Capodistria, J. Coumoundouros, Infantry officers who stayed at the Grand Hotel of Cavalla, as well as that of numerous superior and inferior officers, who lived in Cavalla either alone or with their families. Even in the very streets

of the city, any inhabitant wearing anything of military character, or similar to it, was stripped of it by the first Bulgarian or Turkish soldier who chanced to meet him, and such property was delivered to the appropriate Bulgarian or Turkish storehouse, the sale of articles of this nature being strictly forbidden in the city.

After this search, the plundering of Cavalla as above described having been as far as possible completed, Mr. Anghelof, the Bulgarian sub-lieutenant of Reserves, was appointed Governor of the city. He dismissed the Turkish Mayor and appointed the Greek Serdaroglou and a Municipal Council composed of Greeks. Thanks to the energetic action of Mr. Serdaroglou, the scanty importation of flour (once or twice a week), which during the mayoralty of the Turk had been begun in order to prevent the entire annihilation of the Greek population of Cavalla by starvation, through distribution of bread cards at the bakeries was considerably increased. The quality of the bread was somewhat improved, the poor of the city were well cared for (distribution of bread and food were gratis) and generally the city of Cavalla began to be greatly relieved from the evils from which it had been suffering for many months. Still, a great number of the houses of the city, which were left vacant on account of the speedy departure of their owners, were plundered, during the first months, by the Turks, Jews and refugees, with the toleration of the Bulgarians, and whatever could be taken away was plundered (tiles, timber, windows, ceilings, doors, glass, things of iron, etc.), so that only the walls are now standing.

Finally, the large military depot at Kioutsouk-Orman containing material for entrenchment was, in the early days of the Bulgarian occupation, completely pillaged by the Bulgarian Army, which utilized all this material for the various works of entrenchment constructed in and outside of Cavalla, and along the line of the fortifications of the city. It also took away all the wood contained in the warehouse belonging to the city of Cavalla, which was to be used for housing of the refugees, and generally the Bulgarians carried away arbitrarily and without giving a receipt whatever would be in the least useful to them, no matter whether it belonged to the Greek Government or to the city of Cavalla, or to individuals, whose goods were, to be sure, commandeered, but were appraised — those that had such good luck — at the twentieth of their actual value.

In Drama, where from the beginning there was a Greek Governor (Mr. N. Bakopoulos) and a Greek Mayor (Mr. Phessas), and some

other Greek officers, as I was accurately informed, during my residence there for a few days (9-18 February), there were committed far fewer arbitrary acts and plunderings of the properties of the Greeks and of the Greek officers of the garrison of the city, by Bulgarians and Turks, and the populations suffered less from the dearth of provisions and were much less decimated by starvation, the Greek authorities having taken their measures in time. However the Bulgarians gave free vent there too to their cupidity, for their own advantage, having repeatedly brought from Bulgaria various things of prime necessity and sold them at exorbitant prices in the market of Drama, prices which differed only a little from those in the market of Cavalla.

No. 76

*Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zalocostas,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.*

SOFIA, March 27/April 9, 1917.

I have the honor to submit to you, herewith attached, a copy of a more recent document, sent, on March 23d, to the Prime Minister, concerning the critical situation created in Macedonia by reason of the total lack of provisions and particularly of bread.

In Cavalla, in consequence of the difficulties of transporting provisions from Drama and the lack of every care on the part of the Bulgarian military authorities for the organization of more or less regular communication between Cavalla and Drama, the inhabitants have for months suffered from the insufficiency of provisions, and particularly of bread, which was even sold at from 10 to 15 drachmas the okka. In the beginning such hardships were noticeable only in Cavalla, where a good many deaths occurred from starvation. But recently, and particularly during the last month, the crisis has extended generally to all parts of Eastern Macedonia, a great many deaths occurring from starvation not only in Cavalla, but also in Drama and Serres. Undoubtedly the same situation prevails in the various villages where the situation is unknown because the villagers are forbidden for military reasons to go from the villages to the cities, which certainly aggravates the crisis in provisions which was felt only in the cities. During the last forty days alone, 1,800 persons have died from starvation in Cavalla, according to official and reliable information which I have received from there, and thirty persons a day, on an average, die in Drama. Two months ago the Bulgarian Government sent to

Eastern Macedonia a quantity of wheat for the needs of the native population, and although that was not enough, it did suffice to relieve the situation somewhat.

The wheat which was furnished was not given gratuitously, but the administration of Drama each time paid the price to the Bulgarian Government. But, for nearly two months now, the quantity furnished has been gradually decreased, until it has been reduced to 60 grams of bread daily for each person. Other things of first necessity are either totally wanting or are sold at exorbitant prices, which even the richest inhabitants can not afford to pay. Therefore, during these last two months the situation in Eastern Macedonia has become critical and, in fact, desperate on account of the large number of deaths from starvation which have occurred, [particularly] amongst the Grekes, because the Turkish army has furnished provisions to the Mussulmans and the Bulgarians to the Slavic-speaking villages. In Drama and in some other cities, thanks to the initiative of the Greek Prefect and the praiseworthy financial aid of the rich, soup kitchens were established for the relief of the poor, but unfortunately these kitchens can not be operated regularly because provisions can not be purchased.

Concerning this desperate condition created in Eastern Macedonia, I have up to the present day repeatedly made, both in writing and verbally, strong representations to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here and to the Prime Minister, to whom I have addressed a strong protest against the destruction carried on in Eastern Macedonia. I reminded him of the express promises given to Greece for the safeguarding of the lives and properties of the inhabitants and called his attention to the deplorable impression which the policy of the Bulgarian Government would create in Greece, since it could not but influence public opinion there and the existing friendly relations between the two countries. Not satisfied with these steps, I called also on Mr. Dobrovitz, the Director of the Political Office of His Majesty, to whom I explained in the most detailed manner the deplorable situation in Eastern Macedonia, and begged him to bring all these facts to the notice of the King, in the hope that His Majesty would intervene energetically with the Bulgarian Government for the amelioration of the situation. I protested strongly to Mr. Dobrovitz against the indifference shown in this matter by the Bulgarian Government and emphasized the fact that if this continues, it could not but considerably influence the relations between the two states. Mr. Dobrovitz pretended a com-

plete ignorance of the situation but promised to transmit to His Majesty the King all that I said to him.

I also took similar steps with the official German circles here and asked our Royal Legation at Berlin to take this matter up with the German Government.

NAOUM.

APPENDIX

*Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Dr. V. Radoslavoff,
President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria.*

SOFIA, March 23/April 5, 1917.

Mr. President of the Council:

The Legation of His Hellenic Majesty has repeatedly, by verbal and written representations, called the serious attention of the Royal Government of Bulgaria to the critical situation in the part of Hellenic Macedonia occupied by the Bulgaro-German troops, caused by the want of provisions and particularly of bread, and insisted on the absolute necessity of taking without delay the necessary steps to remedy a really deplorable situation.

Unfortunately, up to the present time all these representations have brought no practical result, and, according to accurate information which I have received, more than 1,800 persons have died in Cavalla from starvation within forty days; in Drama, about thirty persons die daily from the same cause, and the same deplorable occurrences are repeated in all the other centers of occupied Greek territory. Last month, hardly 60 grams of bread were daily distributed to each of the unfortunate inhabitants, who totally lack any other food.

Reminding Your Excellency of the express obligations undertaken at the time of the entrance of Bulgaro-German troops into Hellenic Macedonia, I consider it my duty to inform you that, if this situation continues unabated and if no radical and urgent steps are soon taken, all the Hellenic population of the occupied places will be exterminated either from starvation or by epidemic diseases.

In the presence of this desperate situation, I must raise my voice against these proceedings and these cases of neglect which daily cause the death of a great number of Hellenic citizens and will cause more in the future, and, placing the entire responsibility upon the Bulgarian Government, must insist with all my energy that, independently of all

other considerations, be it only for reasons of humanity, steps finally be taken and strictly carried out to put an end to a situation which, I am sure, Your Excellency is the first to deplore.

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high esteem.

NAOUM.

No. 77

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

SOPIA, June, 1/14, 1917.

The Bulgarian authorities in Eastern Macedonia recently notified the inhabitants who desire to go to the interior of Bulgaria in order to be established there, or to find work, that they should enter their names in special registers. A large part of the population, suffering from want of food and dying from starvation, accepted the proposal and the transportation of them with their families to the interior of Bulgaria has begun, they being temporarily established at Tatar-Bazardjik, Kara-Bachli, Philippopoli, northern Bulgaria and in Dobroudja. The refugees who are arriving in large numbers are in a desperate condition on account of privations. It is said that in the registers of Drama alone 10,000 [words illegible] have been registered, a step taken to render the population less dense in order to facilitate the revictualling of Macedonia and also to increase the laborers in the cities and villages of Bulgaria, where there is now a great dearth of laborers, but perhaps this measure is intended as a systematic removal from Macedonia of the Hellenic population, for hidden political reasons, namely, to destroy the present Hellenic character of the country. It is not known whether Slavophones have emigrated, but about 5,000 Mohammedans have arrived in Bulgaria and some in Sofia. In consequence of the action of the Turkish consul at Philippopoli, they are to be sent to Turkey.

According to an official report, up to the 15th of April (O. S.) 6,000 persons had died from starvation in Cavalla, and in Drama and Serres the situation is the same. The condition of the people is literally lamentable, for, apart from the reduction of the population owing to the thousands of deaths from starvation, the economic situation of the inhabitants has become desperate on account of the exorbitant rise in the prices of the things of prime necessity. The mayor of Cavalla, in order

to save the population, begs the Royal Government to send him aid in the form of money as a loan to the city, assuming the obligation to repay it on the reëstablishment of the former situation.

I am proceeding to make the proper representations concerning the transportation of the population to the interior of Bulgaria, and am asking for explanations and the affording of protection by the local authorities to the families which are being thus deported.


NAOUM.

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